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O T I i n i 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-2-102(3)0) (2008). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
ISSUE 1: Did the trial court err in denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment and granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on whether probable 
cause existed for Defendants' arrest and prosecution of Plaintiff Jeff Howe under Utah's 
false alarm statute? This Court reviews a summary judgment ruling for correctness, 
viewing "the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party." Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ^ 6, 177 P.3d 600. 
ISSUE 2: Did the trial court err in granting Defendants' motion for summary 
judgment and dismissing Plaintiffs' state law claims on the grounds that Plaintiffs' notice 
of claim failed to meet the requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act? The 
trial court's decision presents a question of law, which this Court reviews for correctness. 
Bellonio v. Salt Lake City Corp., 911 P.2d 1294, 1296 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).2 
ISSUE 3: Did the district court err in granting Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment and dismissing Plaintiffs' 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim based on qualified 
immunity? The trial court's decision presents a question of law, which this Court 
reviews for correctness. Allen v. Ortez, 802 P.2d 1307, 1309 (Utah 1990).3 
1
 Preserved at R. 1048-50, 784-796, 2003-2014. 
2
 Preserved at/?. 1988-1990. 
3
 Preserved at R. 1994-2028. 
1 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
The central statute in this case is Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-501, "Making a False 
Alarm." That statute provides: 
76-9-105. Making a false alarm — Penalties. 
(1) A person is guilty of making a false alarm if he initiates or circulates a report or 
warning of any fire, impending bombing, or other crime or catastrophe, knowing that the 
report or warning is false or baseless and is likely to cause evacuation of any building, 
place of assembly, or facility of public transport, to cause public inconvenience or alarm 
or action of any sort by any official or volunteer agency organized to deal with 
emergencies. 
(2) (a) Making a false alarm relating to a weapon of mass destruction as defined in 
Section 76-10-401 is a second degree felony. 
(b) Making a false alarm other than under Subsection (2)(a) is a class B 
misdemeanor. 
(3) In addition to any other penalty authorized by law, a court shall order any 
person convicted of a felony violation of this section to reimburse any federal, state, or 
local unit of government, or any private business, organization, individual, or entity for 
all expenses and losses incurred in responding to the violation, unless the court states on 
the record the reasons why the reimbursement would be inappropriate. 
Additional relevant statutes and other materials are provided in the Appendix. 
871111 1 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case arises out of the arrest and prosecution of Plaintiff Jeff Howe ("Howe") 
for allegedly making a false alarm by reporting to Salt Lake City police dispatch a 
burglary in progress at West High School on the morning of June 27, 2003. Following 
the dismissal of the criminal prosecution on a directed verdict with a finding the 
prosecution had presented "no evidence" to show Howe committed the offense, Plaintiffs 
filed this action for false arrest, malicious prosecution and civil rights violations. 
Following discovery, the case came before the trial court on Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment on the lack of probable cause for the arrest and prosecution 
and on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing all of Plaintiffs' claims. 
The trial court denied Plaintiffs' Motion, concluding that Plaintiffs failed to show the 
undisputed facts established a lack of probable cause as a matter of law. The trial court 
granted Defendants' Motion, finding Plaintiffs' state law claims barred by the UGIA and 
Plaintiffs' civil rights claims barred by qualified immunity. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A. The Decision to Charge Jeff Howe with "Making a False Alarm" Occurred in 
the Context of a Heated Public Debate Between Salt Lake City and the Alarm 
Industry Over How to Deal with "False Alarms." 
1. For about the past 10 years, there has been an ongoing debate between Peak 
Alarm and the alarm industry generally, on the one hand, and the Salt Lake City 
government on the other, over the best way to address the problem of private security 
alarms going off when there is no underlying crime. See generally R. 112-113. 
3 
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2. Effective December 1, 2000, Salt Lake City adopted Ordinance No. 5.08.095, 
creating a policy under which Salt Lake City police generally do not respond to alarms 
unless someone at the scene verifies the alarm was caused by suspicious activity. R. 990-
91; 2273-2275 (definitions and penalties). The City refers to this as "verified response." 
{See Appendix). 
3. After passing its "verified response" ordinance, the Salt Lake City Police 
Department received substantial recognition and accolades for the program. According 
to Defendant Shanna Werner, "[l]aw enforcement from the United States and Canada are 
contacting our department daily" seeking assistance with false alarms, R. 2465, and Salt 
Lake City has "won three national awards with our alarm program." R. 2452-2453. 
Werner herself is "frequently asked to speak at conferences" regarding verified response. 
R. 2518; 2262-63, 2282-83. Defendant Sergeant James Bryant worked on "verified 
response" with Werner and accompanied her to some of these engagements. R. 2261-62. 
4. The Salt Lake City Police Department advocated that other cities adopt 
verified response as well. R. 2518. By all accounts, in her official role as Alarm 
Coordinator, Werner was a "zealous" advocate for "verified response." R. 2575, 2477. 
5. In opposition, representatives of the alarm industry, including Howe, as 
chairman of a Utah-based alarm industry group, believed verified response was not the 
best approach, voiced the alarm industry's opposition to "no-response" ordinances (its 
term for "verified response"), and publicly advocated alternatives. 7?. 112, 2575. 
R7 i i n i 
4 
6. As one example of its public advocacy, Peak Alarm was a signatory to a full-
page ad addressing the merits of verified response and urging citizens to contact their 
mayor and city council, attend council meetings and air their views. R. 2312. 
7. Just a little more than a month before his arrest, Howe and another Peak 
Alarm employee attended a meeting of the Murray City Council on the subject of verified 
response. R. 1030. Werner and Bryant attended and spoke in favor of verified response. 
Howe and the other Peak Alarm employee attended and advocated a different approach. 
R. 1028-29. 
8. In the course of her advocacy, Werner repeatedly denounced the alarm 
industry publicly: 
a. Werner told the Wall Street Journal that as far as she was concerned 
"this whole alarm business is a scam." R. 2434-36. 
b. In a letter that appeared in the June 2002 issue of Security Sales 
magazine, Werner stated: "It is so common within the alarm industry for emotion 
to take control and a 'smoke-and-mirrors' approach to be used in an attempt to 
cloud the issue." She also accused the industry of "selling a product" that "works 
correctly only one percent of the time." R. 2439. 
c. Discussing Savannah, Georgia's consideration of the alarm issue, 
Werner stated: "Alarm companies like to have free emergency response, with no 
responsibility but to rake in that monthly monitoring fee." R. 1004-1007. 
871113 1 
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d. Werner told an alarm industry publication that it is a "shame the alarm 
industry does not practice" honesty as the best policy, leaves customers "feeling 
more violated than the burglar would have," and tries to "bully, threaten, and scare 
and make the customer feel guilty." R. 1015. 
e. Werner told KSL News that the alarm industry was "preying on [the] 
fears" of senior citizens, "selling them this alarm system as the panacea for all ills." 
R. 2432. 
9. Werner's advocacy was fueled by encouragement from her supervisor, Bryant, 
and her efforts were approved and facilitated all the way up the chain of command to the 
Chief of Police. See, e.g., R. 2128; no number btwn 2363 and 2364; R. 2314-2321; 
R. 2359; R. 2452-2453; R. 2450-53; R. 2455; R. 2461-63; R. 2490 at 25, 2491 at 26, 29, 
2492 at 30; R. 2473-75; R. 2487 at 158-59. 
10. Both Werner and Bryant used religious metaphors to characterize their and 
their opponents' positions. See R. 2443 (Werner says, "It looks like Delaware is 
preaching the 'gospel,'" and Bryant responds, "Spread the good word Shanna. Amen!"); 
R. 2445 (Werner says, "I often run across the stupid alarm companies giving us the 
wrong address;" Bryant responds, "And, given our enlightened thinking, why were the 
police even responding?????"); R. 2441 (In an email to Bryant regarding Howe's 
criminal trial, Werner says "I am taking tomorrow off and Monday will be in court most 
of the day for the day of reckoning for Mr. Jeffrey Howe."). 
C71 111 1 
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11. Werner claimed to her supervisors, "I receive more complaints from Peak 
Alarm customers, than all the other alarm companies put together." 7?. 2470. In her 
deposition, however, Werner testified that was not true. R. 2391 at 288-89. 
12. In addition to tarring the alarm industry generally and Peak Alarm 
specifically, Werner and Bryant also deployed threats of litigation or prosecution. For 
example: 
a. As far back as March 2000, Werner referred specifically to Utah's false 
alarm ordinance in an industry publication 
b. After learning that the California Alarm Association wrote a paper using 
statistics from Salt Lake City's own website, Werner threatened "Publication of this 
paper will result in litigation." R. 2468. 
c. Werner characterized communications between the insurance and alarm 
industries as "a conspiracy between those leaders in the industry and State Farm 
leaders to go to City Council and try to force a reversal of verified response." Id. 
(emphasis added). Rather than recognize this as protected First Amendment 
activity, Werner wrote to the Utah Attorney General that the industry was part of a 
criminal "conspiracy" to "defraud" the public and urged him to "investigate" 
because she believed "if two large industries were planning to reverse a city 
ordinance that perhaps he would like to investigate that." The Attorney General 
determined that charge to be groundless, and urged Werner to retract it, but she 
never did. R. 2344, 2465-66. 
7 
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d. In an email sent shortly after verified response took effect, Werner 
instructed Salt Lake City police dispatchers regarding what it would take to 
prosecute an alarm company employee for giving false information. Specifically, 
she told them that part of the case required that the operator "have the intent of 
passing false information," and directed them to ask "a question that would 
personally commit he or she [sic] would allow us to charge them [sic] criminally." 
R. 2358. 
e. On another occasion, Werner threatened participants at an alarm industry 
conference that she was "'looking to make a case against someone' in the alarm 
industry for making a false alarm to police dispatch, and [that she] was determined 
to have an alarm company employee arrested and prosecuted to send a message to 
the industry." R. 2577; see also R. 2574-78. 
f. Giving a preview of what Salt Lake City would bring down on Howe 
just weeks later, Bryant told the Murray City Council in June 2003 that if Murray 
Police "were getting eight thousand calls, which was [Salt Lake City's] most recent 
figure before verified response, from a group of citizens reporting crimes that did 
not occur, they would have an ordinance that made it a crime to make a false police 
report and given the resources they were committing they should have considered 
prosecution in those cases." R. 1034. 
8 
B. June 27, 2003: Peak Alarm Receives and Reports Burglar Alarms and 
Verification of an Intrusion at West High School. 
14. Plaintiff Peak Alarm is a local company that provides private security 
services, including remote burglar alarm monitoring, for businesses, residences and 
government entities. R. 109. 
15. Jeff Howe is the son of Plaintiff Jerry Howe, the founder of Peak Alarm, and 
was at all relevant times the Manager of Peak Alarm's Central Station, where Peak Alarm 
remotely monitors its customers' alarms. R. 110. 
16. Peak Alarm's customers include the Salt Lake City School District. R. 116. 
17. On June 27, 2003, a day when school was not in session, Dianne Hoyt, the 
lunchroom supervisor at West High, arrived at the school at about 6:30 a.m. to prepare 
meals for a summer program. R. 1906-07. 
18. As an authorized user of the alarm system at the school, Hoyt disarmed the 
alarm for the areas where she and her staff would be working. Because no one besides 
Hoyt and her staff were authorized to be in the school, she left the alarm engaged in areas 
of the school where no one was authorized to be. R. 1907. 
19. At 8:46 a.m., Peak Alarm's Central Station received multiple burglar alarms 
triggered by motion sensors detecting intrusion in various areas of the school. R. not 
numbered btwn 813& 814, 814, 815, 2054-55. 
20. At 8:48 a.m., Hoyt called Peak Alarm from West High. Peak Alarm 
dispatcher Brook Mills answered the call. R. 817-18, 840, 2054. 
21. The following conversation ensued: 
9 
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Hoyt: Hi. We just had two people walk in and walk upstairs 
and set the alarm off. 
Brook: Okay, so everything is okay? 
Hoyt: Yeah. 
Brook: Okay. 
Hoyt: But I have no idea who the kids were that came in. 
Brook: Oh really, they just walked in there and started setting it 
off, huh? 
Hoyt: Yeah. 
Brook: Are they still there or did they leave? 
Hoyt: They are still in here I guess. They went upstairs, 
upstairs. 
Brook: Yeah, we're getting [the alarm] on the second floor, on 
the north media stairs. 
Hoyt: So we don't even know who they are. 
Brook: Okay. Do you want me to dispatch police or what do you 
want me to do. 
Hoyt: You know, I would, just to get them. 
Hoyt: Okay... . 
R. 840, 
22. After hanging up with Hoyt, Mills tried to contact the "responsible parties" on 
the Peak Alarm "call list" for the Salt Lake School District account, but she was unable to 
reach them. She then called Salt Lake police dispatch. R. 818-21, 823, 824, 827-28. 
23. Salt Lake Police dispatcher Joann Ryan answered the call from Mills: 
Mills: [T]his is Brook with Peak Alarm. I have a burglar alarm for 
you at a business. 
Ryan: Okay. You know we don't do burglar alarms. 
Mills: Even if there are people inside and — 
Ryan: That's right. If it's a panic alarm we go or a robbery alarm. 
Mills: Well, what it is, is it's a school, it's West High and there is 
people, teachers, a couple teachers and stuff inside. There's 
been two kids that have run into the building and they have 
not left the building yet. Would you guys respond on that 
still or no? 
10 
Ryan: Only if they called us from the school and asked us to help 
remove them. 
Mills: Oh, okay. 
Ryan: Yeah, burglar alarms - why would a burglar alarm go off if 
there's people inside? 
Mills: Because they're on the first floor and the kids went up to the 
second floor. 
R. 831. 
24. After speaking with Ryan, Mills attempted to call Hoyt back to ask her to 
contact the police directly, but there was no answer. R. 819-20, 824. 
25. Mills and her supervisor, Valerie Petersen, then approached Howe with what 
they described as an emergency or panic situation - multiple alarms at West High; the 
presence of unknown intruders with unknown intent; verification by someone at the 
scene; and employees inside the school. R. 822, 1902-03. 
26. Howe then called Salt Lake City police dispatch himself. Ryan answered the 
call from Howe: 
Howe: This is Jeff with Peak Alarm Company. Hey, we have an 
actual burglar alarm going off at West High, and I guess my 
dispatcher just called up and said you guys weren't going to 
go on an actual burglar alarm? 
Ryan: No, we don't go on burglar - we haven't gone on burglar 
alarms for two years. 
Howe: This is an actual burglary in progress, it's been verified. 
Ryan: No, she didn't say that, she said it was an alarm. 
Howe: She said it was - okay. We actually have people inside and 
my guard is asking for police assistance. 
Ryan: Okay, that's what I needed. 
R. 831. 
27. Ryan dispatched the call from Howe as a burglary in progress. R. 848, 859. 
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28. Ryan wrote in the dispatch log, "PER PEAK.. .PER PEAK GUARD.. .HAVE 
2-3 KIDS...2ND FLOOR...BURG ALARM DROPPED AT 846 HRS...STSG ["see the 
security guard"] IN FRONT...IN UNIFORM." R. 850-56, 859. 
C. Salt Lake Police Respond to West High, Fail to Apprehend the Intruders, and 
Instead Investigate Jeff Howe for Providing Incorrect Information to Dispatch. 
29. Seven Salt Lake City police officers, including Sean Wihongi, responded to 
the scene; Wihongi headed the investigation. R. 861, 867-70, 883. 
30. Based on the dispatch log, Wihongi believed that a Peak Guard was on the 
scene and either had in custody or was pursuing two or three individuals. R. 873-74. 
31. Unable to locate a Peak guard, Wihongi asked police dispatch to seek 
clarification from Peak Alarm. R. 832, 861. 
32. In the meantime, Howe had learned from his dispatchers that it was not a Peak 
Alarm security guard, but a school employee, who had reported that the burglar alarms at 
West High had been triggered by unknown intruders. R. 914-17. 
33. Police dispatch called at Wihongi's request to seek clarification: 
Jeff: This is Jeff, can I help you? 
Dispatcher: Yeah, I was holding to find out if you know where a 
guard is at West High school? 
Jeff: You know, actually it looks like there was a 
miscommunication on our side as well. It was 
actually the teachers that called in that wanted us to 
respond or that wanted the police to respond because 
they got kids running around. 
Dispatcher: Uh-huh. 
Jeff: And they actually decided to call us, not to call, you 
know, for them to you guys, and I believe they were 
going to be waiting out front. But I think I have an 
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inside number that I'm going to try to get a hold of 
them. 
Dispatcher: Okay. So you don't have a guard outside though, 
right? 
Jeff: Yeah, we do not. I said that but that was my mistake, 
I got it wrong from my dispatcher. 
R. 832. 
34. Wihongi interviewed Hoyt, who confirmed her report to Peak Alarm that 
unknown persons had entered the school and set off the alarm. R. 871-875f 894-95. 
35. Another officer reported to dispatch: "The cafeteria people here on the north 
side are doing some loading and unloading and one of them here said that two teenage 
girls went in the north doors here while these guys were here, and to gain access to the 
building." R. 832. 
36. After a cursory search, R. 879, Wihongi did not further investigate the 
reported burglary, but turned his investigation to Howe, concerned that Howe had 
provided incorrect information to police dispatch and caused a substantial police 
response. See 7?. 880-2. 
37. Wihongi interviewed Howe twice that day. At least one conversation was 
recorded. R. 886-87, 888f 904-05. 
38. Their recorded conversation included the following dialogue: 
Wihongi: Thanks for calling me back, sir. I just wanted to clarify 
something on the call in regards to the West High call 
this morning. 
Jeff: Un-huh. 
Wihongi: The information, and we talked about the 
miscommunication coming through to dispatch. 
Jeff: Correct. 
13 
871113 1 
Wihongi: Where did you get that information from, sir? 
Jeff: Okay. What originally happened was I had a dispatcher 
telling me that there was kids out on a site that was 
visually confirmed and that -
Wihongi: The call came in how -
Jeff: No, this is my dispatcher talking to me. She goes, we 
have some kids at West High and that they are, you 
know - it's been visually confirmed that there's kids at 
West High, and I tried to contact the police department, 
they would not respond. What do you want me to do? 
That's when I made the call quickly and then I said it 
was a guard because on 90 percent of the alarms we 
actually send a guard out, and I should have asked my 
dispatcher a little bit more information which I didn't, 
and the dispatcher should have told me no, it was a 
teacher not our guard that actually did the visual 
confirmation, so that was my error. 
Jeff: [Wjhen you have strangers you don't know running 
through the place, that could be a potentially dangerous 
situation. . . . Well then we tried contacting this Diane 
again which, you know, she didn't answer the phone or 
whatever, so we're like okay, what do we do now. And 
that's when it was brought up to me and that's where I 
was worried. And okay, we have police requesting or 
we have an employee of the school requesting PD 
assistance. And the way my dispatcher told it to me was 
that the police weren't going to respond unless they 
actually called it in. 
Wihongi: When you talked to me you made a statement, Jeff, that 
the dispatchers failed to send or failed to respond on 
police services. And the actual quote that you have used 
was whatever it took. And you talked about a panic 
alarm. 
Jeff: Yes, and what I said is to me a panic alarm, this is our 
definition at Peak Alarm, is someone's life could 
potentially be in danger. We know we had an employee 
there, we know we had people that were unauthorized to 
be there. That to me is a potential danger for that 
employee of the Salt Lake City School District. 
14 
Wihongi: Okay. And that was your interpretation. The dispatcher 
led you to believe that someone was in immediate threat 
or danger? 
Jeff: Yes, because they had unauthorized people within the 
building that should not have been in there. And that 
fits into our definition of what a panic alarm is. 
Wihongi: [Y]our dispatcher did a good job, but it sounds like you 
interpreted it wrong. Does that make sense? 
Jeff: No, because that's how they told me. Like I said, they 
said that - in fact they used the word this lady is 
panicking. That's how it was told to me, was that this 
lady was panicking and I heard it from two dispatchers 
that were, one that sat next to the other person. They 
both used the word panicking. 
Jeff: And let me say this. If we're even charged for a false 
alarm, I don't care I was just - hey, charge us if you 
have to, we'll be glad to pay it. I was just worried about 
this person being in danger. 
R. 835-38. 
39. Later that day, Wihongi completed a police report. R. 861, 897-98 (See 
Appendix). 
40. In his report, Wihongi wrote that in his initial conversation with Howe, for 
which no recording or transcript has ever been produced, Howe had stated "whatever it 
takes, I thought this was a panic alarm." R. 861, 887-889, 1523. 
41. Wihongi never listened to any of the recorded calls that are represented in the 
transcript, though they were available. R. 892, 900-03. 
42. There are several errors in Wihongi's report, such as incorrectly stating, "Jeff 
Howe with Peak Alarm stated to dispatch . . . that the guard had 2-3 kids on the 2nd level 
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of the school/' when in fact it was Salt Lake City's own dispatchers who erroneously 
conveyed that misimpression to the police. R. 1520. 
43. Wihongi's report also has omissions, such as Howe's explanation of why he 
assumed a Peak Alarm guard had verified the alarm when in fact it was Hoyt. Id, 
44. Defendant James Bryant, Wihongi's supervisor, reviewed Wihongi's report 
and spoke with Wihongi in the course of his supervisory responsibilities. R. not stamped 
btwn 860 & 861, 929. 
45. Bryant "was the one that noticed what [he] felt was the violation." R. 2154. 
46. Bryant did no independent investigation, but relied on Wihongi's report and 
his conversation with Wihongi, which simply confirmed for him what was in the report. 
R. 952, not numbered btwn 952 & 953. 
47. Bryant also never listened to any of the taped calls or interviewed the Peak 
Alarm dispatchers to find out what they had told Howe. R. 900, 939-40, 1903. 
48. Bryant added to Wihongi's report of the incident, stating in pertinent part: 
I noted that AP Jeff Howe had provided false information to 
SLCPD dispatch in order to get a police response to West High. 
The false information provided was that an employee or agent of 
Peak Alarm was on the scene, and that the employee or agent either 
had contact with or knowledge of unauthorized persons on the 
premises. 
R. not stamped btwn 860 & 861 (emphases added). 
49. Werner also added to the police report, stating in pertinent part: 
I returned from a three week absence to receive a phone call from 
Sgt. Jim Bryant and an office visit from Communications 
Supervisor Diane Powell [sic] advising me of an incident of 
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emergency services abuse at West High School due to false 
information given to police communications by Jeff Howe, the 
Central Station Manager of Peak Alarm. 
During my absence I had received an email from Jeff Howe with 
audio clips of phone conversations between Diane Hoyt, 
lunchroom worker for West High School and the Peak Alarm 
Dispatcher. I listened to this audio clip several times. Jeff had 
requested a return phone call from me. After listening to the 
rationalization of his actions with Officer Wihongi, I felt a phone 
call to him would result in more of the rationalization and 
justification of which I had already heard. The mistruth by Jeff 
Howe on the tape provided by dispatch was very evident and I felt 
listening to more rhetoric was unnecessary. 
R. 862-63. 
50. Bryant and Werner discussed what city ordinances or state statutes might 
apply to Howe's report of the incident at West High to dispatch. R. 2265. 
51. They "determined that two city ordinances were not applicable but a state 
statute was." Id.; R. 2146. 
52. According to Bryant, "The facts didn't easily fit any of the standard statutes 
that we would use, and it took some . . . research on my part to determine what would 
have been an appropriate statute." R. 2159 at 165. Bryant "did some . . . searching of 
other statutes, probably based on a key word for false information, eventually came up 
with the state code section that I cited Mr. Howe with." R. 2147 at 92. 
53. Bryant testified that the false report statute "is probably most applicable, in 
my view, to - maybe to bomb threats or something like that." R. 2157 at 131, 132. 
54. In his 27 year history as a police officer, Bryant had never charged anyone 
under the false alarm statute. R. 2157 at 131. 
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55. Likewise, "[t]he City is not aware of any other instance where an individual 
has been charged by the City for making a false alarm" except for fines levied against 
companies "for alarm technicians activating a false alarm" and "for false alarms 
originating from remote key fobs . . . ." R. 2282. 
56. Bryant determined there was probable cause to believe Howe had violated the 
false alarm statute based on (1) Howe's statement to police dispatch that an employee or 
agent of Peak Alarm was on the scene, and (2) the information that employee or agent 
either had contact with or knowledge of unauthorized persons on the premises. R. not 
numbered btwn 860 & 861, 2147-48. 
57. Bryant testified that "[Howe] had met the elements of this statute by claiming 
that there was a guard on scene and that the guard had contact with suspects, which he 
knew to be false, and that his intent in doing that was to elicit a response from the Police 
Department." R. 2147 at 93. 
58. Bryant emphasized that whether or not Howe said that there were two or three 
kids in custody "wasn't ever my issue with this. It was the fact that there was no guard 
on the scene." R. 2151 at 109. 
59. Bryant contacted the city prosecutor's office, and criminal charges were 
brought against Howe. R. 930, 931, 936. 
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D. Howe Had Reason to Conclude a Crime Was Occurring at West High, and Salt 
Lake City Itself Admitted a Crime Occurred. 
60. Salt Lake City Police Department Dispatch Policies and Procedures define a 
"burglary" as "breaking into, entering or remaining unlawfully in a building" with the 
"intent to commit a crime against a person or property." R. 961. 
61. Ryan testified that a "burglary in progress" is "where a citizen has called in 
believed that someone has entered a building without permission," that she would label a 
call "a burglary in progress" if "there were unauthorized people in the building," and that 
police dispatchers assume someone who is in a building, who is not supposed to be there, 
is there unlawfully with criminal intent. R. 845-46, 849. 
62. Salt Lake City Police Dispatcher Tiffany Battad testified that, for a dispatcher, 
in a similar position to Howe, "[t]here's really no way to figure out what [an intruder's] 
intent is," that if a "business was closed and somebody was there, I could guess that 
there's a criminal activity there," and that when in doubt about whether something is an 
emergency, it is better to err on the side of caution. R. 2222-2225. 
63. Salt Lake City's own internal documents instruct that in responding to a 
burglary alarm private security guards should "always assume that an alarm is a burglary 
in progress." R. 950-951, 978. 
64. Ryan testified that an alarm company can properly report a burglary if it's 
been verified; the alarm company dispatcher does not have to witness the unauthorized 
entry, but can relay information he or she has received from Ihe alarm company 
customer. R. not numbered btwn 846 & 847, 847. 
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65. Ryan testified that "[wjhen an alarm company calls back and verifies that 
there is a person on scene that's verified there has been a break-in or somebody actually 
inside, then I would generate the call for service from police." R. 2218-19. 
66. Werner testified that she has no information that Howe knowingly provided 
false information to Salt Lake City police dispatch. 7?. 2378 at 234. 
67. Wihongi testified that he did not conclude and has no evidence that when 
Howe reported a burglary in progress that morning he knew it was false. R. 889-891. 
68. Similarly, Wihongi did not have and does not have any information that 
indicates Howe was not genuinely concerned about the safety of persons at West High 
School on the morning of the incident in question. R. 899. 
69. Wihongi had no indication that Howe knew police response was unnecessary 
or that there was no emergency at West High that morning. R. 910-11. 
70. Wihongi had no information that would lead him to believe the information 
4 
Howe gave about Peak Alarm's definition of a panic alarm was false. R. 2087 at 126. 
71. Salt Lake City admitted a crime occurred that morning at West High, issuing a 
press release stating: "This was a case of trespass." R. 2249. 
According to a guide used commonly within the alarm industry, the Central Station 
Alarm Association's Glossary of Terms, the term "panic alarm" relates to "a more 
general type of perceived emergency, including the presence of one or more unruly or 
inebriated individuals, unwanted persons trying to gain entry, observed intruders in a 
private yard or garden area, or a medical emergency. Provides police with little specific 
information, but is often the only way a user can call for assistance under abnormal 
conditions." R. 1392-1393 at 12-14 ("our definition of panic is not that someone is 
actually there with a gun, but someone's on-site that shouldn't be there"); R. 1917-18. 
20 
5 7 1 1 1 1 1 
72. Bryant testified that he could "recall having at least one discussion with [a] 
dispatcher . . . about, you know, the possibility that if it were - if it were someone local, 
someone that we could have access to, under the right circumstances we might prosecute 
them for providing false information" when alarm companies gave dispatchers "some 
terminology other than burglar alarm, panic alarm, duress alarm, something that I 
perceived as being made up in order to elicit a response from us . . . ." R. 2140 at 64. 
73. Police Dispatch Supervisor Powers testified that callers mischaracterize 
crimes but that she knew of no circumstance in which a person, other than Howe, had 
been prosecuted. R. 2228-33. 
74. Ron Walters, an individual with eleven years experience as a police officer, 
stated "As a former police officer, I am incredulous that Jeff Howe would have been 
charged with falsely reporting a burglary in progress based on those facts [that an audio 
recording of Hoyt's call to Peak was available], because those facts make out the 
elements of a burglary in progress." R. 2578. 
75. Likewise, John Mabry, a man with extensive experience in the security 
industry, recognized that "[a]s the Central Station Manager on duty at the time, Jeff 
Howe responded properly to the situation." R. 2242. 
E. Howe's Criminal Charges Were Dismissed on a Directed Verdict with a 
Specific Finding of "No Evidence." 
76. During Howe's criminal prosecution, Werner stated "that she hoped Howe 
would be found guilty. T m hoping for the enforcement of our ordinance that it goes 
well,' she said. 'If the jury lets Peak Alarm off the hook, to me that's a signal to other 
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alarm companies to call Salt Lake City police and tell them whatever you want.'" 
R. 2523. 
11. Howe was tried in Justice Court on April 12, 2004, before Judge Paul Iwasaki. 
R. 954-59. 
78. The taped conversations were entered into evidence at trial, and a transcript 
was produced. R. 955 (stating that "Dianne Hoyt. . . contacted Peak concerning the 
alarms, which could be heard on the dispatch recording that was admitted into 
evidence."); R. 830-40. 
79. After hearing the prosecution's case and the tapes of the conversations, Judge 
Iwasaki entered a directed verdict in favor of Howe. R. 954-55. 
80. Judge Iwasaki also issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. R. 954-59. 
Judge Iwasaki's Findings of Fact include: 
[Diane Hoyt] informed Peak's dispatcher that there were two 
individuals in the school who had activated the alarms and they 
were not authorized to be on the premises. She did not know who 
the persons were or what their intentions were. When Peak's 
dispatcher asked if Mrs. Hoyt wanted her to dispatch the Salt Lake 
City Police, Mrs. Hoyt answered in the affirmative. 
[T]he two individuals reportedly inside West High School had 
apparently exited the building by the time the police arrive[d]. At 
least, the police were unable to locate them. 
The witnesses and evidence presented by the City established that 
there was an alarm at West High School, there were two 
unauthorized individuals on the premises of West High School 
which caused the alarm, and that no one knew what was the intent 
of the individuals, including whether they intended to cause a theft 
or commit a felony while in the West High School premises, and 
that Mrs. Hoyt had asked for police assistance in removing the 
individuals from the premises. 
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None of the evidence presented by the City established Mr. Howe's 
intent at the time he contacted Salt Lake City Police dispatch, nor 
was there evidence presented by the City to establish that Mr. 
Howe knowingly or intentionally made false representations to Salt 
Lake City dispatch. 
Id. (emphasis added). {See Appendix). 
81. Judge Iwasaki's Conclusions of Law include: 
1. The City has failed to produce any evidence establishing 
criminal intent. 
2. There has been no evidence presented that Mr. Howe 
knowingly or intentionally made false representations to Salt Lake 
City dispatch or made a false alarm as defined by Code Ann. § 76-
9-105(1). 
Id. (emphases added). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in determining as a matter of law that Salt Lake City had 
probable cause to arrest and prosecute Howe for making a false alarm. Prior to the trial 
court's determination in this case, Judge Iwasaki found in Howe's criminal case that 
Defendants had presented "no evidence" that Howe violated the false alarm statute, a 
finding that satisfies Plaintiffs' burden on summary judgment to establish lack of 
probable cause as a matter of law. At a minimum, that finding, and the other evidence 
Plaintiffs proffered on summary judgment, creates a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether Defendants had probable cause. Plaintiffs are entitled to a jury trial on whether 
Salt Lake City's charging and prosecuting Howe under the false alarm statute was the 
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culmination of a broader effort to squelch political opposition to Salt Lake City's 
preferred approach to dealing with "false alarms." See infra at 24-34. 
The trial court also erred in ruling that Plaintiffs failed to comply with the UGIA. 
Plaintiffs' notice of claim complied with and in fact went beyond the requirements of the 
UGIA, and it was timely served. See infra at 35-37. 
Finally, the trial court also erred in ruling that Defendants are entitled, based on 
qualified immunity, to summary judgment dismissing Plaintiffs' Section 1983 claims. 
The right to remain free from arbitrary arrest and prosecution without probable cause and 
for the purpose and with the effect of punishing protected expression is clearly 
established, and it is for a jury to determine whether Defendants violated that right. See 
infra at 38-50. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS PROBABLE CAUSE ANALYSIS, AND 
AS A RESULT IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS5 MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THAT ISSUE. 
Plaintiffs' claims in this lawsuit largely stand or fall on whether Defendants had 
probable cause to believe that Howe violated the false alarm statute. Probable cause 
Plaintiffs' false arrest claim requires that the criminal charge was "unlawful," which 
means Defendants lacked probable cause. See Terry v. Zions Co-op. Mercantile 
Institution, 605 P.2d 314, 320 (Utah 1979) (defining test as "whether a reasonable and 
prudent man in his position would be justified in believing facts which would warrant 
making the arrest"), overruled on other grounds, McFarland v. Skaggs Companies, Inc., 
678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984). Lack of probable cause is an express element of Plaintiffs' 
malicious prosecution claim. See Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 959 
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requires that the police and prosecution have "believable evidence" to support every 
element of the crime charged. See State v. Johnson, 2007 UT App. 392, ^ 6, 174 P.3d 
654. The threshold question is whether, as a matter of law, there was such evidence. 
A. Judge Iwasaki's Directed Verdict on the Underlying Criminal Charge 
Against Howe Establishes Defendants' Lack of Probable Cause, Entitling 
Plaintiffs to Judgment as a Matter of Law, 
The issue of whether Defendants had "believable evidence" that Howe violated the 
false alarm statute was definitively resolved before Plaintiffs initiated this civil action, 
when Judge Iwasaki directed a verdict in the prior criminal action and made a specific 
"finding of fact" that "[n]one of the evidence presented by the City established 
Mr. Howe's intent at the time he contacted the Salt Lake City Police dispatch, nor was 
there any evidence presented by the City to establish that Mr. Howe knowingly or 
intentionally made false representations to Salt Lake City dispatch." R. 954-59 (See 
Appendix). Based on that finding, Judge Iwasaki concluded: "There has been no 
evidence presented that Mr. Howe knowingly or intentionally made false representations 
to Salt Lake City dispatch or made a false alarm as defined by Code Ann. § 76-5-101(1)." 
Id. 
(Utah Ct.App.1989) (identifying elements of malicious prosecution as: "(1) A criminal 
proceeding instituted or continued by the defendant against the plaintiff; (2) termination 
of the proceeding in favor of the accused; (3) absence of probable cause for the 
proceeding; [and] (4) 'malice,' or a primary purpose other than that of bringing an 
offender to justice."). Some of Plaintiffs' civil rights claims similarly require a lack of 
probable cause as the predicate for the civil rights violations. See Kolender v. Lawson, 
461 U.S. 352,363(1983). 
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Longstanding precedent makes clear the effect of Judge Iwasaki's ruling here. In 
Olson v. Independent Order of Foresters, 7 Utah 2d 322 (1958), this Court held that a 
criminal defendant's acquittal "is evidence of lack of probable cause in a suit for 
malicious prosecution because it tends to prove that the prosecutor did not have a 
reasonable belief that a crime was actually committed." Id. at 325. Olson does not 
expressly address the situation here, but if an acquittal creates "some evidence" of a lack 
of probable cause, a directed verdict with an express finding of "no evidence" makes the 
lack of probable cause conclusive. See State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9 at 1 13, 20 P.3d 300 (a 
directed verdict means the prosecution failed to present "believable evidence of all the 
elements of the crime charged.") (internal quotation and citation omitted). At a 
minimum, a directed verdict makes out at a prima facie case sufficient to survive 
summary judgment. SeeMcKenzie v. Canning, 131 P. 1172 (Utah 1913) ("The burden, 
of course, was on the plaintiff to show want of probable cause. He, in that respect, made 
out a prima facie case by showing his discharge in the criminal prosecution upon a 
hearing and an investigation of the charge before the magistrate."). 
The trial court failed to analyze this issue correctly. First, it erroneously concluded 
that Olson only applies where the statute at issue includes a "defense provision." Ruling 
at 4 (See Appendix). There is nothing in the language of Olson to support that 
conclusion, and it makes no sense. Second, the trial court noted that the failure of the 
prosecution to prove the elements of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt cannot 
estop a fact finder in a civil case from finding that those same elements were proven by a 
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lower standard. Id. at 4-5. Plaintiffs do not disagree. See, e.g., Johns v. Shulsen, 111 
P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1986). But that point is irrelevant here because Judge Iwasaki did 
not acquit Howe, he dismissed the criminal action on a directed verdict with a specific 
finding that the City had presented "no evidence." 
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that Judge Iwasaki's ruling constitutes conclusive 
evidence of a lack of probable cause and entitles Plaintiffs to partial summary judgment. 
Defendants had a full and fair opportunity to present evidence that Howe violated the 
false alarm statute. They were unable to produce any evidence that he did so. The trial 
court erred in allowing Defendants to relitigate that issue by insisting there was in fact 
"believable evidence," even though the prosecution failed to marshal it for the criminal 
trial. As a result, based on the very same set of facts, one Utah court ruled that there 
existed no evidence that Howe committed the crime with which he was charged, while a 
second Utah court ruled that there did exist evidence that Howe committed the crime with 
which he was charged sufficient, as a matter of law, to constitute probable cause to arrest 
and prosecute him. To allow both conflicting results to stand would be deeply unsettling 
to public confidence in the judicial process and the strong public policy in support of the 
6 
finality of judgments. 
See, e.g., Robertson v. Campbell, 614 P.2d 1226, 1231 and n.2 (Utah 1983) 
("Relitigation of the issue of undue influence in the second case should have been 
precluded, and undue influence at the time of execution of the trust established as a 
matter of law," citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27, comment c (1982)). 
27 
871113 1 
B. Judge Iwasaki's Directed Verdict Constitutes Evidence of a Lack of 
Probable Cause Which, in Light of the Statutory Language and the Other 
Undisputed Material Facts, Requires Summary Judgment in Favor of 
Plaintiffs or, at a Minimum, a Trial by the Jury. 
Even if Judge Iwasaki's "no evidence" finding did not constitute conclusive 
evidence that Defendants lacked probable cause, Olson makes it clear that the finding 
constitutes some evidence that Defendants lacked probable cause. The question then 
becomes whether that finding and other undisputed material facts entitle Plaintiffs to 
partial summary judgment, or at a minimum create genuine issues of material fact. 
Answering that question requires an analysis of the statutory language, a task Plaintiffs 
urged as necessary but the trial court failed to undertake. 
1. The False Alarm Statute Can Only Be Construed to Criminalize the 
Reporting of a Crime That the Person Making the Report Has No 
Basis to Believe is Occurring. 
As an initial matter, because the statute at issue is a criminal statute targeting 
speech, the First Amendment requires that it be narrowly construed. "To avoid chilling 
the exercise of vital First Amendment rights, restriction of expression must be expressed 
in terms which clearly inform citizens of prohibited conduct and in terms susceptible of 
objective measurement." / .ML v. State, 2002 UT 110,1J 25, 61 P.3d 1038 (citation and 
internal quotations omitted). 
The plain language of the statute also limits its proper application. First, the statute 
is titled and uses the phrase "making a false alarm" {See Page 2). Clearly, pulling a fire 
alarm to get a day off of school or calling in a bomb threat to get a thrill from the ensuing 
evacuation and response would violate the statute. Equally clearly, an "alarm" cannot be 
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"false" if there is some underlying basis for the "alarm," i.e., credible information about 
an imminent or existing crime or catastrophe. 
Second, while other statutes use the terms "information" or "statement," this statute 
7 
uses the broader term "report." A statute criminalizing any false "information" or false 
"statement" might conceivably be read to refer to any individual piece of information. 
The use of the broader term "report," however, indicates that the overall narrative or crux 
of the matter recounted must be false, i.e., the overall report, and not just some isolated 
8 
item within the report, must be "false or baseless." 
Third, the statute does not criminalize just any false report, but only a report "of any 
fire, impending bombing, or any other crime or catastrophe." That same qualifier, 
although not repeated, clearly applies to the intent element as well, meaning that it is the 
See Savage Industries, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 811 P.2d 664, 670 (Utah 1991) 
("The terms of a statute should be interpreted in accord with usually accepted 
meanings.") Webster's primary definition of "statement" is "something stated: as a: a 
single declaration or remark," whereas a "report" is "common talk or an account spread 
by common talk." See http://www. merriam-webster. com/dictionary/statement; 
http://www. merriam-webster. com/dictionary/report. 
Numerous sections of the Utah Code prohibit and penalize false statements or false 
information. "The department shall refuse to issue or renew a license if the applicant: . . . 
has made a false or misleading statement. . . ." Utah Code § 4-7-7(5)(c). "No person 
may knowingly . . . make any false statement to housing authority personnel. . . ." Id. 
§ 9-4-612(1). "[A] municipality may remove a billboard without providing compensation 
if.. . the applicant. . . intentionally made a false or misleading statement. . . ." Id. § 10-
9a-513(2)(a)(i). "An athlete agent. . . may not (a) give any materially false or misleading 
information . . . . " Id. § 15-9-114(1). Indeed, Salt Lake's "verified response" ordinance 
has this feature. Bryant testified that in the effort to determine what Howe could be 
charged with, he considered statutes and ordinances (including the "verified response" 
ordinance) that criminalize false information or statements, and determined they do not 
apply. See Statement of Facts ]ft[ 52-53. 
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report of a "crime or other catastrophe" that the defendant must have known to be false, 
9 
and not the report of some tangential statement. 
Important public policy implications also support a limited construction of the false 
alarm statute. Because cooperation by members of the public, not to mention private 
security companies, is increasingly essential to public safety, the law must also allow 
reasonable room for error in making such reports. A broad construction of the false 
alarm statute would cast a chilling pall over what must be a concerted community effort 
to enhance public safety. In short, as a matter of constitutional law, statutory 
construction and public policy, the false alarm statute cannot be read to impose criminal 
liability for making any false statement to the police, only for reporting a crime without 
basis to believe it is occurring. 
As Judge Iwasaki correctly ruled, the undisputed material facts conclusively 
establish that Howe had more than sufficient reason to believe a crime was occurring at 
West High School on the morning of June 27, 2003. Additional undisputed material 
facts Plaintiffs proffered in support of their motion for partial summary judgment make 
11 12 
that even clearer. Defendants have admitted that a crime did in fact occur. Therefore, 
See Kimball Condominiums Owners Ass'n v. County Bd. of Equalization of Salt Lake 
County, 943 P.2d 642, 646 (Utah 1997) (looking to grammatical structure as an aid to 
statutory interpretation). 
10 
See Statement of Facts, TJ 80, supra. 
See Statement of Facts, fflf 24-25, 60-75, supra. 
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Defendants cannot have reasonably concluded that Howe had no basis to believe a crime 
was occurring at West High School on the morning in question. 
The only "facts" Defendants relied on for their probable cause determination - that 
Howe told police dispatch a uniformed Peak Alarm guard was present at the scene, that 
he "should have known" no Peak Alarm guard was present, and that he allegedly 
admitted he was willing to say "whatever it takes" to secure a police response - are 
immaterial to the requisite mens rea under this statutory interpretation. 
13 
As to the "guard" statement, although the evidence is to the contrary, this Court 
can assume that Howe "should have known" there was no Peak Alarm guard on the 
scene. The fact that Howe "should have known" this detail was false does not mean he 
knew it was false; it establishes only negligence in failing to gather additional 
information, or at most recklessness, neither of which is sufficient to support a reasonable 
14 
belief that he had the requisite mens rea. Moreover, Howe's statement that there was a 
Peak Alarm guard is immaterial to the core fact justifying police response - that the 
See Statement of Facts, \ 71, supra. Defendants have not argued, nor could they, that 
liability should attach to a mischaracterization of the underlying offense - otherwise, 
anyone who reported an "assault" when the facts established a "battery" instead would be 
subject to criminal liability for making a "false report." 
See Statement of Facts, TJ 38, supra. 
14 
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103 (defining criminal states of mind). 
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alarm was verified. Ms Hoyt, an "alarm user" within the definition of the "verified 
response" ordinance, was a "guard" on the scene. 
As to the "whatever it takes" statement, this Court can assume that Howe was 
willing to say whatever it took to get a police response, but that goes only to his intent to 
get the police to respond, a separate element of the crime charged. No reasonable person 
would conclude from that statement that Howe knew his report of a crime was false. On 
the contrary, the most reasonable conclusion to draw from Howe's insistence that the 
police respond is that he genuinely believed there was an emergency at West High 
requiring a police response. 
Given the foregoing, a proper interpretation and application of the statute, and an 
analysis of Howe's allegedly inculpatory statements shows Judge Iwasaki was correct: 
there is "no evidence," let alone "believable evidence," that Howe violated the statute. 
The verified response ordinance, Salt Lake County Ordinance 5.08.095, provides 
"Except for alarms at a wholesale or retail firearms business, intrusion alarm response 
shall be dispatched by the police department only after a private guard responder has 
confirmed that an attempted or actual crime has occurred at the alarm site." R. 2275. 
The ordinance defines "private guard responder" as including "an alarm user, or a person 
or entity appointed by an alarm user to be responsible to confirm that an attempted or 
actual crime occurred at an alarm site." R. 2273 (emphasis added). Bryant understood 
that a "private guard responder" as used in the ordinance, is not limited to a "uniformed 
security guard" and that it may be "the alarm user." R. 2152 at 113. Dispatch Supervisor 
Diane Powers testified that she understood that the Ordinance required a guard or a 
person at the scene to verify the alarm. R. 2230-31. 
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2. The Totality of the Circumstances Creates, at a Minimum, Genuine 
Issues of Material Fact as to Whether Defendants Had Probable 
Cause. 
Finally, if this Court were to find that the Constitution, rules of statutory 
construction and public policy permit Defendants' reading of the statute to criminalize 
virtually any false statement made in the course of reporting a crime even //the person 
had a reasonable basis to believe a crime was occurring, that would not be the end of the 
analysis. The question would then be whether there are genuine issues of material fact as 
to whether Defendants reasonably concluded that Howe knew his statements were false, 
or unreasonably rushed to that judgment based on their admitted desire to prosecute an 
alarm company employee for making a false alarm in order to send a message to the 
alarm industry. 
The trial court acknowledged that a criminal defendant's "knowledge or intent is a 
state of mind generally to be inferred from the person's conduct viewed in light of all the 
accompanying circumstances. " Ruling at 10-11 (citing and quoting State v. Ingram, 
2006 UT App 237, ^  17, 139 P.3d 286). In its analysis of the totality of the 
circumstances, however, the trial court committed one error after another in concluding 
that not only had Plaintiffs failed to establish the lack of probable cause as a matter of 
law, but Defendants had established probable cause as a matter of law. 
First, the trial court acknowledged but disregarded as "immaterial" the undisputed 
facts that Plaintiffs put forward facts showing that Howe had every reason to believe a 
crime was in progress at West High School on the morning of June 27, 2003. Ruling at 
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23 n.21. The trial court then recited what it considered the 12 "material" facts, which 
have nothing to do with whether Howe knew any statement he made to police dispatch to 
be false. At most, some relate to whether was careless in assuming a Peak Alarm guard 
was on the scene and people were in danger, or knew his report would trigger a police 
response. Finally, the trial court misread the pertinent case law, however, to exonerate 
Defendants for ignoring evidence they knew was available. 
What the court's "probable cause" determination boils down to is an assumption 
that because Howe allegedly said to Wihongi, "Whatever it takes," he must have been 
making the report for the thrill of seeing the police respond or the building evacuated. 
But it strains credulity, given the information Howe had at the time, to think he was 
saying he wanted the police to respond whether or not people were in danger. Indeed, 
Wihongi testified he had no information that led him to believe Howe was not in fact 
17 
worried about people being in danger, precisely as Howe explained. Based on all the 
facts, a jury could conclude that just as Defendants stretched the statute beyond 
recognition to criminalize Howe's report, they also stretched "probable cause" far beyond 
reason to mount a malicious and unconstitutional case. That is the gravamen of 
Plaintiffs' case, and it should be addressed at trial, not on summary judgment. 
16
 See Baptiste v. J.C. Penney Co., 147 F.3d 1252, 1254 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that 
police officers could not rely on a security guard's assertion that a security video showed 
a customer shoplifting without viewing the video themselves and that officers "may not 
ignore available and undisputed facts" in their probable cause determination.). 
17 
See Statement of Facts, |^ 38, supra. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL 
IMMUNITY ACT. 
The trial court ruled that all of Plaintiffs' state law claims must be dismissed 
because Plaintiffs' notice of claim, served on Defendants pursuant to the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act ("UGIA"), Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 et seq., failed to meet 
18 
the requirements of the UGIA. Ruling at 12-14, 15-17. That ruling was clear error. 
A. The Notice of Claim Was Sufficient to Alert Defendants to the Nature of 
Plaintiffs' Claims. 
The trial court correctly noted that the version of the UGIA applicable to the acts 
giving rise to Plaintiffs' claims in this action permitted suits against government 
employees when they act with "fraud or malice/' and that this Court has recently held 
that "[w]hether a notice of claim contains an allegation of fraud or malice depends on the 
content of the notice as a whole, not on the use or nonuse of particular words." Ruling at 
12 -13 (citing and quoting Mecham v. Frazier, 2008 UT 60, ^ j 20). In Mecham, this 
Court made it clear that "the UGIA does not require that a notice of claim against state 
officials in their individual capacity expressly aver 'fraud' or 'malice.'" Id. at f^ 19. 
The trial court also ruled that Plaintiffs' state constitutional claims must be dismissed, 
even though not subject to the UGIA's notice of claim requirements, because they do not 
establish the necessary "flagrant violation," i.e., "a violation of'clearly established' 
constitutional rights 'of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Ruling at 14-15 
(citing and quoting Spackman v. Bd. ofEduc. of Box Elder County Sch. DisL, 2000 UT 
87, TI23, 16 P.3d 533). The trial court's cursory ruling appears to be based on its analysis 
of probable cause, discussed above. Because that conclusion was erroneous, the 
conclusion that Plaintiffs failed to create a triable issue of material fact on whether 
Defendants' actions constitute "flagrant violations" of Plaintiffs' constitutional rights is 
also erroneous. 
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Instead, the plain language "requires that a notice of claim contain only (1) 'a brief 
statement of the facts,' (2) 'the nature of the claim asserted,' and (3) 'the damages 
incurred by the claimant so far as they are known.'" Id. Moreover, "a plaintiff need only 
include enough specificity in the notice to inform as to the nature of the claim so that the 
defendant can appraise its potential liability." Id. {quoting Houghton v. Dept. of Health, 
2005 UT 63, If 20, 125 P.3d 860). A notice of claim "meet the standards required to state 
a claim for relief." Houghton, 2005 UT 63, \ 19. 
The trial court failed to correctly apply these precedents, ruling that Plaintiffs' 
notice of claim was deficient because it "fail[ed] to assert any claims of fraud or malice 
against Defendants in their individual capacities." Ruling at 14. That statement is simply 
incorrect. Although not required to do so, Plaintiffs' notice of claim actually uses the 
"particular word" - "malicious" - and actually sets forth specific claims for relief, 
19 
including the elements of each claim. Plaintiffs' notice plainly complies with the 
statutory requirements as elucidated by this Court. It contains a statement of the facts; it 
identifies the claims asserted and it makes clear they are directed against individual 
defendants; and it addresses damages. Read as a whole, the notice of claim clearly sets 
forth the core claim against the individual Defendants, particularly Werner and Bryant -
19 
See Appendix at #5 ("Salt Lake City and its officers, agents or employees" retaliated 
against Howe for the purpose of "maliciously inhibiting the free exercise of rights granted 
under the United States and Utah Constitutions"; they also engaged in "malicious 
prosecution" by mounting a criminal prosecution against Howe for a "primary purpose 
other than bringing an offender to justice" - the very definition of "malice" for purposes 
of a malicious prosecution claim). 
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that they viewed Plaintiffs as part of a criminal enterprise, bore them tremendous ill will, 
and as a result brought to bear the full power of law enforcement and the criminal justice 
system for the improper purpose of sending a clear message that companies such as Peak 
Alarm had to play by their rules. The trial court erred in concluding that Plaintiffs' notice 
of claim was insufficient to allow Plaintiffs to present that claim to a jury. 
B. The Notice of Claim Was Timely. 
The trial court ruled that Plaintiffs' state law claims must be dismissed for the 
additional reason that their notice of claim was allegedly untimely. Ruling at 15-17. 
That ruling was also clear error. 
As the trial court correctly stated, the UGIA requires a notice of claim to be served 
within one year of when the cause of action arises. Id. at 15 n.9. The trial court then 
discussed the underlying chronology, concluding that "Plaintiffs had until July 30, 2004, 
to file a notice of claim... ." Id. at 16. The court then inexplicably refers to Plaintiffs' 
Complaint, noting it was filed on April 7, 2005. Id. at 17. While that is true, it is 
irrelevant to the timeliness of the notice of claim. Plaintiffs served their notice of claim 
on June 25, 2004, and trial court's discussion of the underlying chronology establishes 
20 
that Plaintiffs' notice of claim was timely. 
20 
The trial court's perplexing discussion of the timeliness of Plaintiffs' notice of claim 
makes more sense in relation to Defendants' argument that Plaintiffs' false arrest claim is 
barred by the statute of limitations. Although not addressed by the trial court, that 
argument is wrong. Defendants rely on a 1977 decision of this Court, Tolman v. K-Mart 
Enterprises, 560 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1977), to assert that a false arrest is complete on the 
date of the arrest. However, a 2007 United States Supreme Court case, Wallace v. Kato, 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT DEFENDANTS ARE 
ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND THEREBY DISMISSING 
PLAINTIFFS5 42 U.S.C. § 1983 CLAIMS.21 
A. Plaintiffs Adequately Alleged a Fourth Amendment Unreasonable 
22 Seizure Violation. 
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be secure from unreasonable 
seizures. U.S. Const. Amend. IV. Any seizure greater in scope than a Terry stop is 
"reasonable only if supported by probable cause." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 
363 (1983). 
In this case, the trial court ruled, "the Court as a matter of law determined that 
Plaintiffs failed to show that Defendants acted without probable cause." Ruling at 23. 
594 U.S. 384, 127 S. Ct. 1091 (2007), makes it clear that the false arrest tort continues so 
long as the defendant has not had "legal process," which is an objective finding of 
probable cause. Id. at 389. In this case, Howe was not given such a determination until 
he was tried on April 12, 2004. This case was filed April 5, 2005. R. 1. Accordingly, 
the complaint was timely. This Court did not consider in Tolman when the plaintiff 
received "legal process," and as such it must be construed in light of Wallace v. Kato. 
21 
The trial court set forth the standard for qualified immunity (that the defendants' 
action violated a clearly established right). Ruling at 20. Ultimately, the court 
summarily concluded that the Defendants "are entitled to qualified immunity." Ruling at 
34. However, the ruling contains no analysis to connect the standard with the conclusion. 
See Ruling 18-34. In fact, the ruling appears to dismiss Plaintiffs' section 1983 claims 
not because the rights were not clearly established but for various other reasons discussed 
herein. In fact, the rights claimed are very much clearly established. See, e.g., Strepka v. 
Sailors, 494 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1226 (D. Colo. 2007) (right to be free from arrest without 
probable cause); Peet v. City of Detroit, 502 F.3d 557, 584 (6th Cir. 2007) (the right to be 
free from malicious prosecution); Crowe v. County of San Diego, 13 Fed. Appx. 560, 562 
(9th Cir. 2001) (unpub.) (rights embodied in stigma plus claim clearly established). 
22 
The trial court "considered]" Plaintiffs' unreasonable seizure claim "under the Fourth, 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments." Ruling at 21. However, Plaintiffs argued only that 
the Fourth Amendment applies to the unreasonable seizure. See R. 1994-95. 
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That, however, improperly reverses the burdens. Because this ruling was based on 
Defendants' motion for summary judgment, Defendants had the burden of proving that 
they did have probable cause as a matter of law. As discussed above, Defendants did not 
have probable cause as a matter of law, but in the alternative, at a minimum, it is a 
23 
question of fact, and the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on that issue. 
The trial court also ruled that there was no seizure in this case. Ruling at 23-25. 
Plaintiffs argued that Jeff Howe was seized for four reasons: (a) Jeff Howe was not free 
to leave when Bryant detained him, (b) Bryant physically grasped him, (c) Jeff Howe 
assented to Bryant's show of authority, and (d) Bryant seized Jeff Howe's identification 
for an extended period. R. J994-95. The trial court ruled that the issuance of a 
misdemeanor citation is not a seizure, under Martinez v. Carr, 479 F.3d 1292, 1295 (10th 
Cir. 2007), and that "Plaintiffs failed to show that Bryant's actions [in taking the 
identification] were anything other than an unintended act," Ruling at 25. 
"[T]he determination of reasonableness and probable cause is a question of fact for the 
jury to decide" if there is a dispute "concerning the principal facts." Terry v. Zions Co-op 
Mercantile Assoc, 605 P.2d 314, 321 (Utah 1979) (rev. on other grounds by McFarland 
v. Skaggs Co., Inc., 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984)). In this case, to rule that Bryant did in 
fact have probable cause, the trial court would have to consider all of the inculpatory and 
exculpatory evidence available to Bryant. Wilder v. Turner, 490 F.3d 810, 814 (10th Cir. 
2007). From that, the trial court would have to rule that Bryant reasonably believed that 
Howe knew that there was no burglary in progress (or, depending on this Court's 
construction of the statute, that Howe actually knew the falsity of factual errors that he 
made or that in saying "whatever it takes" Howe was expressing not that he genuinely 
believed that there was an emergency but that he wanted a police response simply to get a 
police response). 
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The trial court erred in its reliance on Martinez. The facts of Martinez are 
inapposite because the defendant officer played a very minor role in the events 
constituting the plaintiffs allegations. 479 F.3d at 1295. In this case, Sergeant Bryant 
very centrally contributed to the illegal acts against Howe. Aware of Werner's attitude 
about the alarm industry and with his own biases, Bryant consulted with Werner about 
what charges to bring, made the decision to cite Howe, told Howe that he was under 
arrest, physically grasped him, and detained his driver's license for at least several hours. 
Moreover, the plaintiff in Martinez had been subject to a "preexisting detention" prior to 
the defendant officer's involvement, and therefore, the defendant officer's involvement 
did not in itself trigger the seizure. Such is not the case here. 
The trial court also erred in ignoring the other ways in which Plaintiffs alleged a 
seizure. A seizure is made in several circumstances, including when: (a) an individual 
complies with an officer's show of authority, (b) in circumstances in which a reasonable 
person would believe that they were not free to leave, and (c) when the person is 
physically grasped by the officer. "[T]he police can be said to have seized an individual 
only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person 
would have believed that he was not free to leave." Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 
567, 573 (1988). "To constitute an arrest, however-the quintessential 'seizure of the 
person' under our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence-the mere grasping or application of 
physical force with lawful authority, whether or not it succeeded in subduing the arrestee, 
was sufficient." California v. HodariD., 499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991)). The "slightest 
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application of physical force" constitutes an arrest. Id. at 625. "'A Fourth Amendment 
seizure occurs when there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement 
through means intentionally applied/" Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1776 (2007). In 
this case, Bryant showed authority and Jeff Howe complied, and Jeff Howe was not free 
to leave. R. 943-44. Bryant physically grasped Jeff Howe's hand during the 
fingerprinting, and Bryant kept Jeff Howe's identification for an extended period of time. 
R. 1918. Because Jeff Howe was in fact not free to leave, he was seized within the 
constitutional meaning. 
B. The Trial Court Failed to Rule on Plaintiffs5 Fourth Amendment 
Malicious Prosecution Claim, Which Was Improperly Dismissed. 
The trial court recognized that Plaintiffs argued that prior to trial, a constitutional 
malicious prosecution claim falls under the Fourth Amendment, and therefore does not 
require the "shocks the conscience" element of the Fourteenth. Ruling at 25). However, 
the trial court offered no more analysis or ruling on this claim. Presumably, though, the 
court believed that it failed on the probable cause issue. Again, this presumption ignores 
that on their summary judgment motion, Defendants had the burden of proving probable 
cause as a matter of law, whereas the trial court only ruled that Plaintiffs did not prove 
the lack of probable cause. 
Plaintiffs properly stated a claim for a violation of the Fourth Amendment based on 
malicious prosecution. The elements that are in issue of this claim are: (1) "the defendant 
caused the plaintiffs continued confinement or prosecution," Novitsky v. City of Aurora, 
491 F.3d 1244, 1258 (10th Cir. 2007), (2) lack of probable cause, id., and (3) "malice or a 
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primary purpose other than that of bringing the offender to justice," Heck v. Humphrey, 
512 U.S. 477, 494 (1994) (Thomas, J. concurring); see also Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Schettler, 786 F.2d 950, 959 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citing the same definition). The fact 
that Bryant issued the citation with Werner's support or encouragement suffices to cause 
the initiation of the prosecution. See Novitsky, 491 F.3d at 1258. In addition, Werner and 
Bryant set in motion the facts that led to Plaintiffs' injuries. As to the last element, all 
that is necessary at this stage is that Plaintiffs show a genuine issue of material fact that 
Defendants acted with a primary purpose other than to bring Howe to justice. Plaintiffs 
met that burden by adducing evidence regarding Werner's attitudes toward the alarm 
industry and her express desire that someone be "investigated" for discussing efforts to 
lobby to repeal the verified response ordinance, and both Werner and Bryant's expressed 
desire to prosecute a member of the alarm industry. See Statement of Facts Y§ 9> H> 13, 
13d, 66. Accordingly, the trial court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment 
malicious prosecution claim. 
C. The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing Plaintiffs' Claims For Insufficient 
Pleadings. 
The trial court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' 
"stigma plus" Fourteenth Amendment claim and on Plaintiffs' non-retaliatory First 
Amendment claim on the basis that they were not sufficiently pled in the complaint. 
Ruling at 25, 33. The trial court erred in relying on Holmes Dev., LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 
38, ]f 31, 48 P.3d 895, because it takes an overly harsh view of the liberal pleading 
standards. The trial court's reliance on that case would require plaintiffs to specifically 
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identify the sub-category of the constitutional violation or to give the defendants a 
roadmap of their legal theories. However, "[a] plaintiff is required, under our liberal 
standard of notice pleading, to submit a 'short and plain statement showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief and 'a demand for judgment for the relief.' The plaintiff 
must only give the defendant 'fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim 
and a general indication of the type of litigation involved.'" Code v. Utah Dept. of 
Health, 2007 UT App 390, H 4, 174 P.3d 1134 (alternation and citations omitted). 
Moreover, constitutional claims are given particular lenience. In L.K. v. Gregg, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court of Appeals ruled that the plaintiffs "failed to plead their claim 
with sufficient specificity" where the plaintiffs alleged a violation of their due process 
rights but did not reference 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 413 N.W.2d 833, 835, 837 (Minn. App. 
1987). The state supreme court reversed, ruling "the better practice would be for the 
court to look at the substance, rather than the form, of the underlying action." 425 
N.W.2d 813, 818 (Minn. 1988). In so holding, the court recognized that "[t]he U.S. 
Supreme Court has required only two allegations to state a cause of action under section 
1983. A plaintiff must allege: (1) that a person has deprived him or her of a federal right, 
and (2) that the person so depriving acted under color of state law." Id. (citing Gomez v. 
24 
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980)). Therefore, Plaintiffs were required only to provide 
In Calhoun v. Thomas, 360 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1274 (M.D. Ala. 2005), the court 
permitted a claim to proceed where the plaintiff had not even alleged the correct 
constitutional amendment on which the claim was based. 
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only fair notice and a general indication of the type of litigation involved. Their 
complaint more than adequately does so. 
1. Plaintiffs Adequately Pled a Stigma Plus Claim. 
A Fourteenth Amendment "stigma plus" claim arises when there is proof of a 
defamatory statement "that was published [and] was: (1) false; [and] (2) stigmatizing; and 
(3) that some further interest was adversely affected." Gardetto v. Mason, 854 F. 
Supp.1520, 1535 (D. Wyo. 1994); see also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711 (1976). In 
this case, Plaintiffs set forth Werner's defamatory statements in detail in the complaint, 
R. 113 -115, and alleged that they were false, R. 78 %1,82^ 18, 84 \ 22. The statements 
are stigmatizing as a matter of law because they imply dishonesty or immorality. Brady 
v. Gebbie, 859 F.2d 1543, 1556 (9th Cir. 1988) ("[T]he law was clearly established that [] 
a liberty interest was implicated when an employee was stigmatized by charges of 
immoral or dishonest conduct."). Finally, the arrest constitutes the adversely affected 
fiirther interest. See Gobel v. Maricopa County, 867 F.2d 1201, 1205 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(holding that allegations of false statements made in connection with an illegal arrest 
constitute a defamation plus claim) (abrogated on other grounds by City of Canton v. 
Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989)). In this case, Plaintiffs alleged violations of the Fourteen 
Amendment (R. 122 at ^ 44; See Appendix,), and Plaintiffs set detailed facts that support 
the "stigma plus" claim. Accordingly, plaintiffs gave defendants "fair notice" of their 
claims and sufficiently pled the Fourteenth Amendment stigma plus claim. 
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2. Plaintiffs Sufficiently Alleged Their Non-Retaliatory First 
Amendment Claim. 
In addition to the claim that Defendants violated Plaintiffs' constitutional rights by 
retaliating against Plaintiffs for Plaintiffs' protected First Amendment acts, Plaintiffs also 
have a claim that Werner violated Plaintiffs rights through her own government speech. 
Simply stated, this claim is that government is entitled to take a political position on its 
own policies and to use its powers to promote its policies. However, government speech 
25 
can go too far. Government cannot use its power to deprive Plaintiffs of a right. In this 
case, the Defendants, as government, have taken and strongly expressed particular 
political viewpoints. However, they have gone too far in calling Plaintiffs liars and 
"The First Amendment protects citizens' speech only from government regulation; 
government speech itself is not protected by the First Amendment." N.A.A.C.P. v. Hunt, 
891 F.2d 1555, 1565 (11th Cir. 1990). It is thus well settled that the government may not 
abridge "equality of status in the field of ideas" through viewpoint discrimination in 
forums. Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972). The government 
may not monopolize the "marketplace of ideas." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 
395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). Also, the government may not compel individuals to support 
or promote causes, candidates or ideologies. Lanthrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 873 
(1961) (Black, J. dissenting); see also N.A.A.C.P. v. Hunt, 891 F.2d at 1566. The 
common thread is that the government cannot use its power to force its viewpoint upon 
others or to drown out opposing views, particularly when the government itself has 
chosen to address a public policy matter. The government can of course have a 
viewpoint on a matter of important public policy such as public safety. The government 
can promote its viewpoint. But, the government cannot quash other viewpoints. Indeed, 
"[restrictions on government speech seem to spring from one ideal: Tf there is any fixed 
star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe 
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or 
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.'" N.A.A.C.P. v. Hunt, 891 
F.2d at 1565 {quoting West Virginia State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 
(1943)). 
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impugning Plaintiffs' integrity. The effect is that Defendants have chilled Plaintiffs' and 
others' free exercise of constitutional rights. 
Plaintiffs' complaint specifies that Werner's "tactics and methods have included the 
development and implementation of a wide-ranging public campaign that features 
exaggerated, misleading and/or false statements against the alarm industry itself and 
individuals within the industry," R. 82 \ 18, and it details Werner's public comments. 
The complaint describes that "[t]he purpose and effect of this campaign have been to 
unfairly and seriously malign Peak Alarm and, . . . to send a chill over the expression of 
legitimate viewpoints on an important matter of public interest. Ms. Werner, Sgt. Bryant 
and others acting in their individual and official capacities on behalf of Salt Lake City 
have taken even more aggressive action in their campaign, going well beyond vigorous 
advocacy and false and misleading statements to even more egregiously illegal and 
unconstitutional actions." R. 84 U 21-22. Moreover, in their section 1983 claim, 
Plaintiffs specifically invoked the First Amendment. R. 122^47. Plaintiffs state that 
defendants not only "retaliate[d]" but also "and deprive[d], inhibited] and punish[ed]" 
Plaintiffs free exercise "by seeking to restrain [Plaintiffs] from . . . expressing and 
advocating their viewpoint on the subject of 'no-response' ordinances while Salt Lake 
City remained free to express and advocate its own competing viewpoint on the same 
subject." Id. Yet, the trial court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment on 
26 
There is ample evidence that Werner systematically and over an extended period, 
publicly defamed Plaintiffs and those associated with them, and that she did so in her 
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this issue because "such claims will not be considered as they were raised for the first 
time in Plaintiffs' Opposition." Ruling at 33. As discussed above, this grossly 
exaggerates the liberal pleading standards embodied in the rules. See Utah R. Civ. P. 8. 
Plaintiffs' complaint gives fair notice to defendants of their non-retaliation First 
Amendment claim, and the trial court erred in dismissing this claim. 
D. The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing Plaintiffs5 Substantive Due Process 
Claim. 
The trial court ruled that "Plaintiffs failed to show any extreme conduct against any 
Defendants including Defendant Werner" and thereby dismissed Plaintiffs' substantive 
due process claim. Ruling at 27. The trial court indicated that "conscience shocking" 
conduct "'typically involve[es] some violation of physical liberty or personal physical 
integrity.'" Ruling 26-27. But, "'malicious and sadistic' abuses of power by government 
officials, intended to 'oppress or to cause injury' and designed for no legitimate 
government purpose, 'unquestionably shock the conscience."' Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 
75, 94 (2d Cir. 2005). "This is so because our constitutional notion of due process rests 
on the bedrock principle that we must protect the individual 'against the exercise of 
power without any reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate governmental 
official capacity as alarm coordinator of Salt Lake, with the full authority of the Salt Lake 
Police Department behind her. R. 2336 at 51, 1004-1007. For example, Werner testified 
that she sent the Attorney General letter "[a]s alarm coordinator," R. 2465-66, and that 
she saw it as within her responsibilities to attack the alarm industry over what she saw as 
unfair contract provisions. Even if Defendants had never arrested Howe, they still 
violated Plaintiffs' constitutional rights by using the force of their authority to chill free 
expression and to defame Plaintiffs. 
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objective.'" Id. {quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1998)) 
(alteration omitted). In this case, Plaintiffs have developed substantial evidence that 
would enable the jury to conclude that Defendants intended to punish Jeff Howe for his 
political speech, as Shanna Werner put it, to send "a signal to other alarm companies." 
Such motives are unjustifiable by any legitimate government interest and, therefore, 
shock the conscience. As such, the trial court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs' substantive 
due process claim. 
E. The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing Plaintiffs' Claims Against the City 
and Supervisor Defendants. 
The trial court recognized that Plaintiffs alleged that Werner "engaged in a 'pattern 
of tortious conduct'" through her string of defamatory statements. Yet, the trial court 
dismissed Plaintiffs' claims against the City and official capacity defendants because it 
ruled "Plaintiffs failed to identify a policy or custom that caused their injury." Ruling at 
28. This ruling, however, fails to recognize that demonstrating a continued "pattern of 
tortious conduct" itself evidences a constitutionally violative policy or custom. "The 
existence of a pattern of tortious conduct by inadequately trained employees may tend to 
show that the lack of proper training . . . is the 'moving force' behind the plaintiffs 
injury." Board of County Comm 'nrs of Bryan County, Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 
407-08 (1997). In this case, in addition to showing the undisputed pattern of defamation, 
Plaintiffs also showed that the supervisor defendants continuously failed to discipline 
Werner despite her violations of City policy and her defamatory statements. In fact, they 
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encouraged her. Chief Atkinson told her, "I like it," R. 2455, and Bryant told her "Spread 
the good word Shanna. Amen!" R. 2443. 
Regarding Plaintiffs' claims against Dinse and Atkinson, the trial court determined 
that "Plaintiffs sole claims against Defendants Dinse and Atkinson" are encompassed in 
paragraph 27 (R. 118) that Dinse and Atkinson made it clear to Jerry Howe that they 
27 
authorized and approved Ms. Werner's conduct. Ruling at 30. The trial court 
considered the additional specific allegations against Dinse and Atkinson "conclusory 
and immaterial." As a result, the trial court ruled that "Plaintiffs failed to show any 
causal connection between Dinse's and Atkinson's actions as supervisor's [sic] and 
Werner's and Bryant's alleged unlawful and malicious actions." Ruling at 31. 
A plaintiff must show "an 'affirmative link' between the supervisor and the 
violation, namely the active participation or acquiescence of the supervisor in the 
constitutional violation by the subordinates." Serna v. Colorado Dept. of Corrections, 
455 F.3d 1146, 1151 (10th Cir. 2006). Plaintiffs demonstrated that Dinse and Atkinson 
participated in and encouraged Werner's conduct. Dinse called an alarm industry group 
"unscrupulous," R. btwn 2363 and 2364, and Atkinson encouraged Werner to give the 
industry "hell," R. 2455. Moreover, they never disciplined Werner but stood by her 
performance. R. 2486 at 107, 2484 at 89, R. 2463 at 61, 63. Those allegations are 
27 
However, Plaintiffs Amended Complaint also alleges, "one or more individual 
Defendants failed to take action they were required to take to properly supervise their 
subordinates and stop their unlawful and malicious actions, in a manner that amounts to 
deliberate indifference." R. 122 \ 46. 
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sufficient to survive summary judgment that Dinse and Atkinson acquiesced or 
participated in Werner's conduct. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants lacked probable cause to charge and prosecute Jeff Howe for making a 
false alarm. If there is a question about that, it must be resolved by a jury in light of the 
totality of circumstances, including the evidence that Defendants were motivated not by a 
desire to bring an offender to justice, but by a desire to advance a political agenda by 
silencing opposing voices. Such a shocking abuse of state power cannot be viewed as per 
se reasonable. Plaintiffs request that this Court reverse the trial court's ruling. 
DATED this Jjfcjfoy of February, 2009. 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH PC 
Stephen C. Clark 
Kathleen E. McDonald 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE SA1 I 1 AKE CITY JUSTICE COl >R I 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CITY OF SALT LAKE, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. 
Case No. 03 CR 11570 
MICHAEL JEFFREY HOWE, 
Judge Paul F. Iwasaki 
Defendant. 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial on Monday, April 12, 2004. Paul 
Curtis of the Salt Lake City Prosecutor's Office represented Salt Lake City. Richard A. Van 
Wagoner and Trystan B. Smith represented the defendant Michael Jeffrey Howe ("Mr. Howe"). 
The Court heard the testimony of the following witnesses - Dianne Hoyt, Joann Ryan, Tiffany 
Simpson, Diane Powers, Shaun Wihongi, and Chuck Smith - and reviewed the exhibits that were 
admitted into evidence. At the close of the City's case in chief, Mr. Howe moved the Court to 
dismiss the Information on a number of grounds, both in writing and orally i lie ( OHM in -mi 
KBCSSQWgE) 
APR 3 0 ?90-i 
Salt Lake City Justice Court 
argument and considered defendant's Motion to Directed Verdict, which it granted from the 
bench. Based upon the foregoing, the Court enters the following Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Salt Lake City School District ("SLCSD") has a contract with Peak Alarm Co. 
("Peak") pursuant to which Peak provides certain security services for SLCSD schools, including 
West High School. Certain nt these srrvuvs tm Itidt the use of remote motion sensonrtfj alarms. 
On June 27, 2003, when school was not in session and no unauthorized individuals were 
permitted on ih< premises, certain of these motion sensoring alarms were activated at West High 
School in Salt Lake City, Utah. Shortly thereafter, Dianne Hoyt, an employee of the Salt Lake 
City School District, contacted Peak concerning the alarms, which could be heard on the dispatch 
recording that was admitted into evidence. She informed Peak's dispatcher there were two 
individuals in the school who had activated the alarms and they were not authorized to be on the 
premises. She did not know who the persons were or what their intentions were. When Peak's 
dispatcher asked if Mrs. Hoyt wanted her to dispatch the Salt Lake City Police, Mrs. Hoyt 
answered in the affirmative. 
2 Peak's dispatcher contacted the Salt Lake City Police Dispatch and informed it of 
the call from West High School. The police dispatcher said Salt Lake Police would not respond 
to the call, even though there had been visual confirmation of the two individuals, unless the 
client itself made the call to Salt Lake City Police Dispatch. Shortly thereafter during the 
morning of June 27, 2003, the defendant Michael Jeffrey Howe contacted Salt Lake City Police 
-2-
dispatch lequesting that the Sail I \lt City Police respoit I in (lit ILIIIII af Wrsi High S< lionl and 
informing police dispatch they had been unable to reestablish contact with the client. 
3. Short h thereafter, several Salt Lake City Police officers arrived at West High 
School and attempted to intercede with what may have been a burglary in progress. However, 
the two individuals reportedly inside West High School had apparently exited the building by the 
time the police arrive. At least, the police were unable to locate them. However, the Salt Lake 
City Police officer in charge of the investigation spoke with Mrs. Hoyt who again confirmed that 
two unauthorized individuals had entered the premises and set off the alarms. 
4. On July 25, 2003, Salt Lake City filed a criminal Information against Mr. Howe 
allegitfg4ir*h#dcommitted the public offense of violating the Utah State Code, Making a false 
alarm, specifically, section 76-9-105(1). The original Information charged Mr. Howe with 
committing a Class B misdemeai 101 whuli upoin omiUion, otihl result in a punistininii ol i 
term not exceeding six months and a fine of up to $1,000 plus an 85% surcharge, for a total of 
$1,850. 
5. Mr. Howe demanded a trial by jury. On December 8, 2003, the City filed an 
Amend H Information allying Mi Howe had \ tolatccl tin identical >l tic u>de provision, but 
amending the Information to an infraction instead of a Class B misdemeanor, which could result 
inafni<j ot up to $ 7S() 00 plus an K'>% aiuhaige, ioi a total ol it»3K/ M) 
6. Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-105(1), the single count of the Amended Information, 
required thai I lit ( ity prove against Mr. Howe the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt 
in order to convict him of the crime as charged: 
-3-
A person is guilty of making a false alarm if he initiates or 
circulates a report or warning of any fire, impending bomb, or 
other crime or catastrophe, knowing that the report or warning is 
false or baseless and is likely to cause evacuation of any building, 
place of assembly, or facility of public transport, to cause public 
inconvenience or alarm or action of any sort by any official or 
volunteer agency organized to deal with emergencies. 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
7. The witnesses and evidence presented by the City established that there was an 
alarm at West High School, there were two unauthorized individuals on the premises of West 
High School which caused the alarm, and that no one knew what was the intent of the 
individuals, including whether they intended to cause a theft or commit a felony while in the 
West High School premises, and that Mrs. Hoyt had asked for police assistance in removing the 
individuals from the premises. The evidence presented above was undisputed. 
8. None of the evidence presented by the City established Mr. Howe's intent at the 
time he contacted Salt Lake City Police dispatch, nor was there any evidence presented by the 
City to establish that Mr. Howe knowingly or intentionally made false representations to Salt 
Lake City dispatch. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Therefore, the Court hereby concludes: 
1. The l 'ih has iiiiinl in pioducc .my evidnict rstablishmg aumiuil mlent. 
2. The City has not met the necessary elements to prove Mr. Howe violated Utah 
Code \ n n §76-9 -105(1) 
-4-
3. There has been no evidence presented that Mr. Howe knowingly or intentionally 
made false representations to Salt Lake City dispatch or made a false alarm as defined by Code 
Ann. § 76-9-105(1), 
4. Accordingly, the defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict is hereby granted. 
SO ORDERED. 
MED this V day of ^ ^ / ^ ^ , 2004. 
B Y T H E C O U ^ ^ , 
Paul F. Iwasaki 
Justice Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Paul A. Curtis 
Salt Lake City Prosecutor ""s Office 
-5-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
4-
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached instrument was mailed on the 
day of April, 2004, on the following: 
Paul A. Curtis 
Salt Lake City Prosecutor's Office 
349 South 200 East, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
ydidfsJjfLLs* </C 
N \21582\2\findingsconclustons wpd 
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TRANSCRIPTION OF DISPATCH RECORDINGS 
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I rGANALAKMI r 
li DISPATCHER: Is ,uat because of the kids? 
3 "~ PEAK ALARM: I would assume. 
4 DISPATCHER: And where do we meet your guard at? 
5 PEAK ALARM: Just in the front of the schooL 
6 DISPATCHER: Is he in uniform or she? 
7 PEAK ALARM: Yes, he is. 
8 DISPATCHER: Alrighty. 
9 PEAK ALARM: And you got the address right? 244 
10 North 300 West? 
11 DISPATCHER: Un-huk 
12 PEAK ALARM: Okay. Thank you. 
13 DISPATCHER: Un-huk 
14 PEAK ALARM: Do you have an incident number or a -
15 not a - yeah, an incident number? 
16 DISPATCHER: 471. 
17 PEAK ALARM: Okay, thank you. 
18 DISPATCHER: You bet 
19 PEAK ALARM: Bye. 
20 (New call). 
21 DISPATCHTl^ce dispatch, Joanne. 
22 PEAK ALARM- Hi Joanne, this is Brook with Peak 
23 Alarm. I have a burglar alarm for you at a business. 
24 DISPATCHER: Okay. You know we don't do burglar 
25 alarms any more? 
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PEAK ALARM This is Jeff with Peak Alarm Company, 
Hey, we have an actual burglar alarm going off at West 
High, and I guess my dispatcher just called up and said 
you guys weren't going to go on an actual burglar 
alarm? 
DISPATCHER: No, we don't go on burglar - we 
haven't gone on burglar alarms for two years. 
PEAK ALARM: This is an actual burglary in progress, 
it's been verified. 
DISPATCHER: No, she didn't say that, she said it 
was an alarm. 
PEAK ALARM: She said it was - okay. We actually 
have people inside and my guard is asking for police 
assistance. 
DISPATCHER: Okay, that's what I needed. 
PEAK ALARM: Okay. And I'll talk to her about that 
just to clarify that, but no, this is an actual 
break-in. 
DISPATCHER: Okay, and how many, how many? 
PEAK ALARM: They said two or three kids. 
DISPATCHER: Where at? 
PEAK ALARM: Didn't get that information just the 
alarm's coming from the second floor, but they're 
running throughout the whole building. 
DISPATCHER: What time did the alarm drop? 
1 PEAK ALARM: Even if there are people inside and -
2 DISPATCHER: That's right If if s a panic alarm we 
3 go or a robbery alarm. 
4 PEAK ALARM: Well, what it is, is if s a schooL 
5 it's West High and there is people, teachers, a couple 
6 teachers and stuff inside. There's been two kids that 
7 have run into the building and they have not left the 
8 building yet Would you guys respond on that still or 
9 no? 
10 DISPATCHER: Only if they called us from the school 
11 and asked us to help remove them. 
12 PEAK ALARM: Oh, okay. 
13 DISPATCHER: Yeah, burglar alarms - why would a 
14 burglar alarm go off if there's people inside? 
15 PEAK ALARM: Because they're on the first floor and 
16 the kids went up to the second floor. 
17 DISPATCHER: Yeah. What you need to do is call the 
18 responsible to respond, and if they need us to assist 
19 then call us. We can't respond on burglar alarms any 
20 more. 
21 PEAK ALARM: Okay, thank you. 
22 DISPATCHER: Un-huh. 
23 PEAK ALARM: Bye. 
24 (End of tape) 
25 TAPE2 
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11 OFFICER: - you say the security
 v , in the front 
12 of the school? 
13 DISPATCHER 11)1 III says he's in a uniform J oil 
14 hell be in front 
15 OFFICER: 104, I don't see him there (inaudible). 
16 DISPATCHER: 101 68. 
17 OFFICER: The cafeteria people here on the north 
18 side are doing some loading and unloading and one of 
19 them here said that two teenage girls went in the north 
110 doors here while these guys were here, and to gain 
111 access to the building. 
112 DISPATCHER: 104. Do you see the Peak security 
113 guard in the rear at all? He's not out front? 
114 OFFICER: Nof I'm with one of the nutrition, 
115 cafeteria people here on the north side. 
116 OFFICER: 459. I did not see him in the back 
117 parking lot area. 
[18 DISPATCHER: 104. 
119 OFFICER: (Inaudible) he's not on the south side 
120 either can you call him back and get his location? 
21 Pause. 
22 (Welcome to Peak Alarm company this phone call may 
23 be recorded for quality purposes. Please wait a moment 
24 and a representative will be with you in a moment) 
25 PEAK ALARM: Good morning, Peak Alarm. 
6 
11 DISPATCHER: Hi, this is Salt Lake City police 
12 calling. One of your people there called in that there 
13 was a burglary at West High at241 North 300 West, and 
14 that you had a Peak Alarm guard that was there. 
15 PEAK ALARM: Okay. Let me put you through to our 
I 6 central station. One moment 
I 7 DISPATCHER: Okay. 242, stand by, you're next 
18 Pause. 
J 9 DISPATCHER: I'm on hold with them, Pant I -
J10 PEAK ALARM This is Trisha, how may I help you? 
111 DISPATCHER: Trisha, this is Salt Lake City police 
112 calling. Somebody there called in an alarm at West 
113 High school 
114 PEAK ALARM: Right 
115 DISPATCHER: Your guard, do you know where your 
J16 guard is? He's not in front, we're faying to find him. 
117 PEAK ALARM Hold on a moment 
118 DISPATCHER: 161 stand by, number two. Oh my gosh, 
119 this is ridiculous. 
120 PEAK ALARM This is Jeff, can I help you? 
121 DISPATCHER: Yeah, I was holding to find out if you 
|22 know where a guard is at West High school? 
123 PEAK ALARM: You know, actually it looks like there 
124 was a miscommunication on our side as well It was 
125 actually the teachers that called in that wanted us to 
I • 
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1 respond or that waste police to respond because 
2 they got kids running around. 
3 DISPATCHER: Un-huh. 
4 PEAK ALARM: And they actually decided to call us, 
5 not to call, you know, for them to you guys, and I 
6 believe they were going to be waiting out front But I 
J 7 think I have an inside number that I'm going to try to 
8 get a hold of them. 
9 DISPATCHER: Okay. So you don't have a guard 
10 outside though, right? 
11 PEAK ALARM Yeah, we do not I said that but that 
12 was my mistake, I got it wrong from my dispatcher. 
13 DISPATCHER: Okay, all right that's fine. No 
14 problem. But was there an alarm that did go off, or 
15 was it just the teachers calling it in? . 
16 PEAK ALARM There was an original alarm and we were 
17 tiying to contact an RP to go down. Later on, like 
18 about, you know IS minutes later the teachers called 
19 back saying hey the alarm went off, we're here but 
20 there's kids running around, we want some police here 
21 to help us because they don't have any panic alarms 
22 there. 
23 DISPATCHER: Okay. You know, they're telling me 
24 that they do want a guard out there, could you have one I 
25 go that way, or. I 
81 
I 1 PEAK ALARM Yeah, we could probably get someone out! 
2 there if you want to. But like I say, this was the I 
3 teachers calling it into us as a panic alarm and I 
4 they're worried because they have kids running around I 
5 DISPATCHER: Okay. Yeah, the officers are saying 
6 they do need a guard to go out there, so do you know I 
7 about how long it would take someone to get there? I 
8 PEAK ALARM Probably about IS minutes. I 
! 9 DISPATCHER: Okay. Is there a number that I call 
10 you at directly? I 
11 PEAK ALARM Let me ask you this, I got a question. I 
12 Why do we need a guard out there when it's a panic I 
13 alarm? I mean, it was originally an alarm, burglar, J 
14 but now I have the teachers calling in saying it's a I 
15 panic alarm. I don't know if our guard should be I 
16 responding to a panic alarm. I 
17 DISPATCHER: Okay. Well, you know, the oflicrr did 
18 ask, but hold on just a minute please. 1 
19 PEAK ALARM Okay. 
20 OFFICER: Delta 581 I've arrived at West, III be 
21 on the north side. I 
22 DISPATCHER: That's a 582 at 9:05. 
23 OFFICER: I'll be out on the far corner. I 
24 DISPATCHER: 9:06. (Inaudible) burglar in progress. 
25 Be advised on we're on hold now with Peak Alarm. J 
91 
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1 OFFICER: Alpha 12L When you ge' >Id of them, 
2 have them send their officer on the north aide of the 
3 building. 
4 DISPATCHER: 101 
5 OFFICER: Alpha 161fs arrived, Tm on the west part 
6 DISPATCHER: At 9:07. Alpha 121? 
7 OFFICER: Go ahead. 
8 DISPATCHER: 121, n o w they're saying their guard's 
9 no longer there, do you want him to come back out? 
10 OFFICER: Yes. Alpha 121 ,101 
11 DISPATCHER: 121,1 have the Peak Alarm guy on the 
12 phone right now, do you have just a second for an 
13 update? 
14 OFFICER: Yeah, go ahead 
15 DISPATCHER: 1 0 1 He said that w h e n he initially 
16 called he gave us the wrong information. There was an 
17 alarm that had gone off, but it was a panic alarm done 
18 by the teachers there, so there is no guard on scene. 
19 Like I said, I do have him on the phone. He can have a 
20 guard respond in IS minutes, but he doesnt - he's 
21 asking me why they need to go and I basically said just 
22 send them. 
23 OFFICER: Okay. So this is a panic alarm, this is 
24 not a burg drop is that correct? If he did not see 
25 anyone? 
10 
1 tape. 
2 PEAK ALARM: Yeali H v.asnlf oui p ia id il wasthr 
3 teacher that called i n 
i DISPATCHER: Thafs right 
'/ PEAK ALARM: The teacher whose name is Diane H o y t 
6 DISPATCHER: Of course you know we wouldn't go on 
7 that. 
8 PEAK ALARM: On? 
9 DISPATCHER: Atearhersa>inf, thrMc'< kids m [he 
10 schooL 
11 PEAK ALARM: You wouldn't? 
12 DISPATCHER: Not as a burglar alarm 
13 PEAK ALARM: N o , no, no, no, no, but she's 
14 requesting police as a panic alarm now 
15 DISPATCHER: Well , panic alarm we certainly would 
16 never go OIL That is not - a panic alarm means she's 
17 being held at gun point and being robbed, that's a 
18 panic alarm and we didn't receive a panic alarm, 
19 PEAK ALARM: Okay. Just because our terminology 
20 might be different, our definition of panic is not that 
21 someone is actually there with a gun, but someone's 
22 on-site that shouldn't be and you also have another -
23 DISPATCHER: That would be a burglar alarm then 
24 correct? 
25 PEAK ALARM: N o , 
12 
1 DISPATCHER: H e said that the teachers there at the 
2 school did see some kids go in, so they did it as a 
3 panic alarm. 
4 OFFICER: You have him respond to the scene. He's 
5 given us mixed up information, w e l l clear it up with 
6 him down here. 
7 Pause. 
8 DISPATCHER: Are you there? 
9 PEAK ALARM: Un-huh. 
10 DISPATCHER: Okay, s o n y about that I was faying 
11 to talk to the officer to get more information. He 
12 just - he really says he does need a guard to come 
13 down. 
14 PEAK ALARM: On a panic alarm? 
15 DISPATCHER: Un-huh. 
16 PEAK ALARM: Could you give me Dianne? 
17 DISPATCHER: Yeah, hold on just a second. 
18 DISPATCHER: Dianne speaking. 
19 PEAK ALARM: Yeah Dianne, this i s Jeff from Peak 
20 Alarm. 
21 DISPATCHER: Hey. 
22 PEAK ALARM: Okay. I'm finding out a little bit 
23 more, I think my dispatch screwed up on telling me 
24 certain stuff as welL 
25 DISPATCHER: Yeah, I think so. I listened to th< 
11 
1 DISPATCHER: Yeah, because panic means there's a 
2 weapon involved and someone's life is being threatenecL 
3 Okay? And i f s not semantics because you're an alarm 
4 company. 
5 PEAK ALARM: Okay. Our terminology is different 
6 We have a d ient asking for police to respond because 
7 there's kids in the building that aren't authorized to 
8 be there. 
9 DISPATCHER: But that's not how il was giveii to ui-
10 it was given to us as a burglar alarm. 
11 PEAK ALARM: Okay. But I just described this to 
12 your last dispatcher and she's saying that we need a 
13 guard there. 
14 DISPATCHER: Yeah. What happens is officers are ail 
15 over the place and they're demanding a guard come d o w n 
16 and you guys are saying no. 
17 PEAK ALARM: W e d o n t sendguards on panic alarms. 
18 DISPATCHER: It's not an alarm. 
19 PEAK ALARM: Yes, it is, our definition. 
20 DISPATCHER: It's the same scenario. When an 
21 officer requests your guard to respond on what you gave 
22 us as a burglar alarm, then you need to get a guy down 
23 there. 
24 PEAK ALARM: That's what I'm saying. This isn't a 
? T burglar alarm any more, this is a citizen requesting PD 
13 
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I I response because - call it trespassir °nifyou 
1 2 want to. 
1 3 DISPATCHER: Un-huh, but that's not what the officer 
1 4 is saying. He's saying he wants a guy. 
1 5 PEAK ALARM: But that's what I'm telling you now, 
1 6 could you get someone on a trespassing? 
1 7 DISPATCHER: If you said a citizen's calling we're 
1 8 relaying for (inaudible) at West High. 
1 9 PEAKALARM: Theynow-
110 DISPATCHER: At West High. 
1 11 PEAK ALARM: Thafs what I'm saying now. 
113 all over? 
114 PEAK ALARM- No. They said they wouldn't go without 
115 a guard. That's what I'm trying to get is someone out 
116 there. 
117 DISPATCHER: Okay. Jeff, let me just tell you, when 
118 you talked to Joanne personally a log was made as a 
119 burglary in progress, officers are all.over West High, 
120 officers are there saying get me a guard. Thafs what 
121 we're saying to you and your guard and your person said 
122 no we will not send you a guard. 
123 PEAK ALARM: Dianne Hoyt, the teacher, is asking 
124 police response, okay? 
125 DISPATCHER: Do you think we're there? Do you think 
14 | 
I 1 we're at West High? 
I 2 PEAKALARM- Now you're telling me yes, but the 
1 3 other person said no, they would not respond without a 
J 4 guard. 
J 5 DISPATCHER: That was the first person your first 
1 6 person said to. 1 
1 7 PEAKALARM: I just barely got off the phone saying 
1 8 they're requesting a guard to respond, or the police 1 
1 9 will not I just barely got off the phone with them. 1 
110 DISPATCHER- That was Tiffany. Tiffany just said to 
111 you what? What do you think she said? 1 
112 PEAK ALARM: She said the police are requesting a 1 
113 guard. 1 
114 DISPATCHER* That's right, because we were there. 1 
115 PEAK ALARM: Oh, she didnt state that or at least 1 
116 if she did I didn't understand it because she said 1 
117 they're requesting a guard, they're not going to do 1 
118 anything without a guard. That's how I understood it 1 
119 to be. 1 
120 DISPATCHER Okay, so obviously it's a 1 
121 misunderstanding. 1 
122 PEAKALARM: Okay. So. 1 
123 DISPATCHER We are there, we are requesting a J 
124 guard. 1 
25 PEAK ALARM That's all I wanted was to get police 1 
1 Hi 
1 I out there, rhafsallf ted I 
1 2 DISPATCHER: Poi^e have been out there since your 
I 3 first c i l l 
4 PEAK ALARM: Okay, that's all I wanted to clarify. 
1 5 Thank you so much. 
1 6 DISPATCHER: So you're sending a guard, right? 
1 7 PEAKALARM: Huh? 
1 8 DISPATCHER: So you're sending a guard, correct? 1 
I 9 PEAK ALARM: We don't send them in this type of 
1 10 situation. 
I l l DISPATCHER: So you are not sending a guard? 
J 12 PEAK ALARM: We are not sending a guard. 
13 DISPATCHER: Okay, 111 tell the officer that 
1 1 4 PEAKALARM: Thank you. 
15 DISPATCHER: Bye, bye. 
16 Pause. 1 
17 DISPATCHER: See what it does. Okay, there's ring 1 
1 18 one. 1 
1 19 (Welcome to Peak Alarm company. This phone call may 1 
20 be recorded for quality purposes. Please wait a moment 1 
21 and a representative will be with you in a moment) 1 
22 PEAKALARM: Good morning, Peak Alarm. 1 
23 OFFICER WIHONGI: Good morning, is Jeff Howe 1 
24 available? 1 
25 PEAK ALARM: He's out of the office right now. If 
16 
1 you'd like, I can put you through to his voice mail or 1 
2 is there somebody else who can help you? 1 
3 OFFICER WIHONGI: Actually I need to talk to him. I 
4 This b Officer Wihongi, Salt Lake City police I 
5 department Is there another manager that's available? 1 
6 PEAKALARM: Hold on just one moment I 
7 OFFICER: WIHONGI: Thank you. (Hold). 1 
8 PEAKALARM: Sir? 1 
9 OFFICER WIHONGL Yes, ma'am. 
10 PEAK ALARM: I'm going to send you to Garth Wheeler. 1 
11 OFFICER WIHONGI: Garth Wheeler? 
12 PEAKALARM: Garth Wheeler. One moment, please. 
13 OFFICER WIHONGI: Okay, thank you. 
14 PEAK ALARM: This is Garth, can I help you? I 
15 OFFICER WIHONGI: Mr. Wheeler? I 
16 PEAKALARM: Yeah. 1 
17 OFFICER WIHONGI: Officer Wihongi, Salt Lake City 
18 police department 1 
19 PEAK ALARM: Who am I talking to? 
20 OFFICER WIHONGL This is Officer Wihongi from the 1 
21 Salt Lake police department 1 
22 PEAKALARM: Okay. 
23 OFFICER WIHONGI: I - 1 actually wanted to talk to 1 
24 Jeff, and he is apparently out of the office; is that 1 
25 correct, sir? | 
171 
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12 so I donft keep tabs on him, bur ^  ..at's what they 
f 3 told you then I would believe that 
14 OFFICER WIHONGI: Okay, 1 apologize. I just needed 
15 to follow up with him on an incident that happened this 
16 morning, and actually I - probably, yeah, I can't get 
17 it secondhand, I just probably need it from him. Could 
J 8 I leave you a phone number, sir, that he can get a hold 
19 of me later on today if he gets back in the office? 
110 PEAK ALARM: How do you spell your last name? 
111 OFFICER WIHONGI: It's Wihongi, W-I-H-O-N-G-I, and 
J12 first name is Shaun, S-H-A-U-N. 
113 PEAK ALARM: This is an alarm that went off or what? 
114 OFFICER WIHONGI: Yes, an alarm this morning. 
115 PEAK ALARM: Okay. 
116 OFFICER WIHONGI: In regards to a West High school 
117 alarm. 
118 PEAKALARM: Oh. Okay. 
119 OFFICER WIHONGI: And if he can call dispatch, they 
120 can get a hold of me. 
121 PEAK ALARM: Give me that phone number, sir. 
152 OFFICER WIHONGfc 799-3000. 
123 PEAK ALARM: Now, Ray Hicks, our operations manager, 
124 he's over central station, can he call ya? 
125 OFFICER WIHONGfc Actually I just need to talk to 
1 18i 
11 Jeff in regards to statements that he had made to me. 
12 PEAK ALARM: Oh, he already talked to you then? 
13 OFFICER WIHONGI: Yeah, he already talked to me this 
1 4 morning about a situation. But yeah, 111 touch base 
15 with him if he's able to give me a calL 
16 PEAK ALARM Glad to help out 
17 OFFICER WIHONGI: No, and I much appreciate it, sir. 
18 PEAK ALARM Okay. 
19 OFFICER WIHONGI: Thank you, sir. 
] 10 PEAK ALARM: All right 
111 OFFICER WIHONGI: Bye. 1 
112 PEAK ALARM* Bye. 1 
113 Pause. 1 
114 PEAK ALARM (Welcome to Peak Alarm company—) 1 
115 PEAK ALARM: Good morning, Peak Alarm. 1 
116 DISPATCHER: Hi, this is Joanne, Salt Lake police J 
117 department 1 
118 PEAK ALARM Yes. 1 
119 DISPATCHER: We were just verifying what kind of an [ 
120 alarm we got at 8:57 today at West High School, 241 1 
121 North 300 West 1 
122 PEAK ALARM Let me put you through to our central 1 
123 station. J 
24 DISPATCHER: Thank you. I 
25 PEAK ALARM: One moment. 1 i a 
• * & U . U \ 4 1 l m 4 U U .«UV n j O l l i l f U U J i J » O i U K . / MUTT l«JU 1 
1 2 help you? 
1 3 DISPATCHER: Valley, Joanne with Salt Lake police. 
1 4 How are you? 
I 5 PEAK ALARM: Good. 
1 6 DISPATCHER: You guys called us on an alarm to West 
1 7 High school at 241 North. 
I 8 PEAK ALARM: Correct 
9 DISPATCHER: 300 West 
10 PEAK ALARM: Right 
J 11 DISPATCHER: Could you verify what kind of an alarm 
1 12 you guys gave us? 
13 PEAK ALARM: Hold on here. 
14 DISPATCHER: Thank you. 
1 15 PEAK ALARM: Okay. Burg on the second floor north 
1 16 media stairs was the original alarm, but there was 
1 17 multiples on it, so. 
18 DISPATCHER: Okay. Multiples, okay. I got the 
1 19 first alarm drop at 8:46; is that correct? 
20 PEAK ALARM: That's correct 
21 DISPATCHER: Okay. 
22 PEAK ALARM: All right 
23 DISPATCHER: Thank you so much. 
24 PEAKALARM: Thankyou. 
25 DISPATCHER: And that was a multiple burglar alarm? 
1 21 
1 PEAK ALARM: Right, I got the whole north or second 
2 floor went into alarm, so. 
3 DISPATCHER: Okay. All right Thank you so muck 
4 PEAKALARM: Okay. 
5 Pause. 
6 (Welcome to Peak Alarm company—) 
7 PEAK ALARM: Good morning, Peak Alarm. 
8 OFFICER WIHONGI: Good morning, this is Officer 
9 Wihongi Jeff Howe, Officer Wihongi with Salt Lake 
10 City police, Jeff Howe had just left me a number to 
11 give him a call back, can you transfer me to his 
12 office? 
13 PEAK ALARM: Sure, may I have your name again? 
14 OFFICER WIHONGI: Officer Wihongi, Salt Lake city 
15 police. 
16 PEAK ALARM: One moment please. 
17 PEAKALARM: This is Jeff, can I help you? 
18 OFFICER WIHONGI: Hey Jeff, Officer WihongL 
19 PEAKALARM: Yes. 
20 OFFICER WIHONGI: Thanks for calling me back, sir. 
21 I just wanted to clarify something on the call in 
22 regards to the West High call this morning. 
23 PEAKALARM: Un-huh. 
24 OFFICER WIHONGI: The information, and we talked 
25 about the miscommunication coming through to dispatch. 
21 
INTERMOUNTAIN COURT REPORTERS(801) 263-1396 Page 18 to Page 21 
SLC0104POI 
I LUXl\ n U U U T i < V.UA1CIU 
2 OFFICER WIHONGI: There wis ini *ation about an 
3 officer being on scene that was requesting police. 
4 PEAK ALARM: Correct 
5 OFFICER WIHONGI: Where did you get that inf onnation 
6 from, sir? 
7 PEAK ALARM: Okay. What originally happened was I 
8 had a dispatcher telling me that there was kids out on 
9 a site that was visually confirmed and that -
10 OFFICER WIHONGI The call came in how -
11 PEAK ALARM: No, this is my dispatcher talking to 
12 me. She goes, we have some kids at West High and that 
13 they are, you know - it's been visually confirmed that 
14 there's kids at West High, and I tried to contact the 
15 police department, they would not respond What do you 
16 want me to do? That's when I made the call quickly and 
17 then I said it was a guard because on 90 percent of the 
18 alarms we actually send a guard out, and I should have 
19 asked my dispatcher a little bit more information which 
20 I didn't, and the dispatcher should have told me no, it 
21 was a teacher not our guard that actually did the 
22 visual confirmation, so that was my error. Thaf s 
23 where that mistake came from because I assumed it was 
24 our guard, which made an ass out of me, rather than a 
25 teacher that had actually called it in. I originally 
22 
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2 OFFICER WIHOKGL ^ay. And you have that phone 
3 call recorded, right 
4 PEAK ALARM: We do, we do. 
5 OFHCER WIHONGI: Okay. 
6 PEAK ALARM: Including, from what I'm hearing 
7 afterwards, she also called the police department 
8 afterwards. That's what I'm hearing. I dont know if 
9 she did or not, but I'm also hearing that after she 
10 called us up to contact you guys that she actually 
11 placed a phone call as welL 
12 OFHCER WIHONGI: So have you listened to that 
13 recorded message, the initial one coming into dispatch, 
14 I mean your dispatch? 
15 PEAK ALARM: No, I've not yet, but I'm actually 
16 looking at i t I'm trying to find it right now. 
17 OFHCER WIHONGI: Okay, because I had contacted that 
18 Diane Hoyt there at the scene. 
19 PEAK ALARM: Un-huh. 
20 OFHCER WIHONGI: And she's a cafeteria worker, she 
21 is an employee of the schooL 
22 PEAK ALARM: Okay, so it's a cafeteria worker? 
23 OFHCER WIHONGL We had talked a little bit about 
24 why information wasnt given her - to her to call 
25 dispatch. I believe our dispatch had told your 
24 
1 - so when I was calling back saying hey, we have 
2 visual confirmation that it is - that kids are in 
3 there that should not be in there and why aren't you 
4 dispatching a police officer at that moment? And then 
5 she asked and I assumed, I go well, you know, it's our 
6 guard which I assumed, which I was wrong. That came 
7 from me and that was my mistake. When the visual 
8 confirmation actually came from a teacher. Does that 
9 make sense? 
10 OFHCER WIHONGL Okay, it does. And you're saying 
11 that the - we had talked earlier a little bit about 
12 this. 
13 PEAK ALARM: Un-huh. 
14 OFHCER WIHONGL About the teacher and it was 
15 Dianne - 1 dont know if you have your records in 
16 front of you. 
17 PEAK ALARM: I can bring it up right now. I have it 
18 spelled out as a Dianne Hoyt 
19 OFHCER WIHONGI: Okay. And she identified herself 
20 as a teacher? 
|21 PEAK ALARM: As an employee. 
22 OFHCER WIHONGL Okay. And she requested police; 
23 is that coned? 
24 PEAK ALARM: She requested police because some kids 
. 25 had ran in the house, or ran in the building that were 
J 23^ 
1 dispatch to have the complainant call directly to us. 
2 PEAK ALARM: But we couldn't get a hold of her again 
3 because we tried contacting that number back and we 
4 couldn't get a hold of her so now we were like what do 
5 we do now. 
6 OFHCER WIHONGI: Okay. 
7 PEAK ALARM: Does that make sense? Because dispatch 
8 did tell us hey, have her call directly to us. But 
9 then when we tried to contact her through the same 
10 number we couldnt get a hold of her. So it's like 
11 okay, what do we do now. 
12 OFHCER WIHONGI: Was the inf onnation given to her 
13 originally to call the police? 
14 PEAK ALARM: That was given her. 
15 OFHCER WIHONGI: And this is where I'm a Utile 
16 confused because I had sat down and I talked with her 
17 and she said she didn't ask Peak Alarm, she didnt 
18 request Peak Alarm to call the police. In fad, Peak 
19 Alarm asked her, do you want us to call the police? I 
20 asked her at any time did you give their dispatch any 
21 indication that you were under stress or either 
22 yourself was in imminent danger, or any members of your 
23 staff, because she had a lot of people there working in 
24 the cafeteria and she said no, I did not 
25 PEAK ALARM: Okay. I will check on that recording 
25 
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I 1 and I could probably E-mail that ou ou,that 
1 2 recording so you can listen to it But thafs how-1 
I 3 haven't actually listened to that recording yet, but 
1 4 thafs like I said, I read to you what was typed in the 
1 5 computer that - usually when we have a situation like 
\6 that we do ask would you like police assistance. And 
1 7 Pm assuming at that point they said yes, or - unless 
1 8 we wouldn't have contacted you. Fin hoping. Now, 
1 9 maybe my dispatcher screwed up again, I will look into 
110 that and maybe get back with you on that But you 
111 know, that does sound right that we asked her, would 
112 you like police to respond and she said yes. 
113 OFFICER WfflONGt Okay. And another question Jeff, 
114 and like I said, I wasn't there. 
|15 PEAKALARM Yeah. 
116 OFFICER WIHONGt 1 am going to do a report. 
17 PEAK ALARM: Thafs fine. 
118 OFFICER WIHONGt Because IVe got information from 
19 dispatch. And I told you exactly why we were 
20 dispatched. If s a triple B, that means it's a 
21 priority one Something's happening right now so a lot 
22 of officers, a lot of resources we used up at the scene 
23 on that pretty big target this morning. 
24 PEAK ALARM: Understandable. 
26 
1 report But I just want to get both sides of the story 
2 verified, and when I put it in my report to the field 
3 commander or my sergeant 
4 PEAK ALARM: It will probably take me about 10 
5 minutes to bring that other recording up and I will 
6 listen to it and give you more information. If you 
7 even want a copy of that recording,! don't know if you 
8 have E-mail capability, I can actually E-mail these 
9 recordings out 
10 OFFICER WfflONGt If you - let's see, you're at 
11 1534 South Gladiola? 
12 PEAKALARM: Un-huh. 
13 OFFICER WfflONGt What's the west on that or east? 1 
14 PEAK ALARM: Ifs about 3400 West, I believe it is. 1 
15 OFFICER WIHONGI: 3400 West 1 
16 PEAK ALARM: Right off of California Avenue. I 
17 OFFICER WIHONGt Maybe M stop out there some J 
18 time today and just meet with you and give you my 1 
19 business card 1 
20 PEAK ALARM: No problem. 1 
21 OFFICER WIHONGt Like I say, it came in as a I 
22 burglary alarm or it came in as a panic alarm or you 1 
23 tell me what type of alarm it came in as, 1 
24 PEAK ALARM: It originally came in as a burglary J 
25 alarm. We called there and at least, you know, Tm 1 
27JL 
1 1 going off the notes F. ading right now. We called 1 
I 2 there and she answered the phone and thafs when we 
1 3 asked if everything's okay with the burglar alarm. No, 
1 4 some kids came in and are running around the place. 
I 5 Well, you know, and then thafs when the dispatcher 
1 6 probably asked what you said, which sounds right 
1 7 Well, do you want police assistance? You know, because 
1 8 when you have strangers you don't know running through 
1 9 the place, that could be a potentially dangerous 
1 10 situation. And so from what my gathering of the 
I 11 dispatcher was is Pm assuming that Diane Hoyt said 
1 12 yes, send them out Thafs why I have the comment you 1 
1 13 know, she requested the police to respond And then at 1 
1 14 that point the dispatcher contacted police dispatch. 1 
1 15 Now, she made the problem of saying we have a burglary 1 
1 16 alarm which then the dispatcher said we don't respond 1 
1 17 to burglar alarms. Well then my dispatcher said no, we 1 
18 have kids running around and we have teachers there, 1 
19 and ifs an actual-you know, there's actual people 1 
20 running around that shouldn't be there. 1 
21 Well then the officers, and I actually - 1 actually J 
22 listened to this recording. Well then the police 1 
23 dispatcher said well, have them contact us then before 1 
24 we can send anyone out Well then we tried contacting 1 
25 this Diane again which, you know, she didn't answer the 1 
1 28 
1 phone or whatever, so we're like okay, what do we do 1 
2 now. And thafs when it was brought up to me and 1 
3 thafs where I was worried. And okay, we have police 1 
4 requesting or we have an employee of ihe school 1 
5 requesting PD assistance. And the way my dispatcher 1 
6 told it to me was that the police weren't going to 1 
7 respond unless they actually called it ih. j 
8 I mean, it kind of made it sound like we weren't 1 
9 good enough to be calling this in for them. Thafs 1 
10 kind of the impression I got 1 
11 OFFICER WIHONGt How was your dealings with the J 
12 dispatcher? 1 
13 PEAK ALARM: It was actually professional. My 1 
14 dealings were professional with them. And I didn't 1 
15 have any problems with them. And see what I did, is 1 
16 when I called back and I actually spoke with the same 1 
17 person. And I said well, you know we actually have 1 
18 someone there, but thafs when I said I thought it was 1 
19 a guard that had visually verified it when it was 1 
20 actually an emp!oyeer 1 
21 OFFICER WfflONGt When you had talked to me you madej 
22 a statement, Jeff, that the dispatchers failed to send J 
23 or failed to respond on police services. And the 1 
24 actual quote that you have used was whatever it took. 1 
25 And you talked about a panic alarm. I 
29 1 
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j I PEAK ALARM: Yes, and what 1 is to me a panic 
I 2 alarm, this is our definition at Peak Alarm, is 
1 3 someone's life could potentially be in danger. We know 
1 4 we had an employee there, we know we had people that 
1 5 were unauthorized to be there. That to me is a 
1 6 potential danger for that employee of the Salt Lake 
1 7 City School District 
1 8 OFFICER WIHONGI: Okay. And that was your 
I 9 interpretation. The dispatcher led you to believe that 
110 someone was in immediate threat or danger? 
1 11 PEAK ALARM: Yes, because they had unauthorized 
1 12 people within the building that should not have been in 
1 13 there. And that fits into our definition of what a 
I 14 panic alarm is. Does that make sense? 
1 15 OFFICER WIHONGI: I'll just tell you, to be honest, 
116 that's not my understanding. I may be wrong and I 
1 17 could go back to the station and check, and that's what 
1 18 I told you earlier on today that that's not my 
119 interpretation of what the (inaudible) on this. 
1 20 PEAK ALARM: And maybe that's where we're having 
1 21 problems is because our definition of a panic alarm is 
1 22 riot that it necessarily is in danger, but someone's 
1 23 life could potentially be in danger. 
I 24 OFFICER WIHONGL Yeah. Talking to Diane there at 
30 
1 1 touch base with them on this. 
1 2 PEAK ALARM: Un-huk 
I 3 OFFICER WIHONGL And as f ai as burglar alarms and 
1 4 not having somebody respond to burglar alarms, thafs 
I 5 one of the policies here at our department 
I 6 PEAK ALARM: And we know that 
1 7 OFFICER WIHONGI: And I'm kind of speaking to the 
J 8 lady and the cafeteria workers there at the scene. 
1 9 Yeah, it was her statement and then I have a written 
1 10 statement that she didn't request police, she says it's 1 
111 kind of our protocol if there's a couple of kids that 1 
1 12 come walking in and we didn't know that we were going 1 
113 to call the security, otherwise we would have called 1 
1 14 police. And I asked her about/ did you give their I 
1 15 dispatcher any indication that you were in immediate 1 
116 jeopardy, that you or yourself? And she said no, I 1 
117 didn't I wasn't stressed, I just knew there were a 1 
1 18 couple of kids that probably shouldn't have been on the 1 
119 property and thafs why I called Peak Alarm, otherwise I 
20 I would have called police. Now, again, youVe got 1 
21 that recorded? 1 
22 PEAK ALARM: I'll be able to look it up and see what I 
23 happened. If that's the case my dispatcher really 1 
24 screwed up and I need to - really, yeah. | 
25 OFFICER WIHONGI: Here we go John - Jeff, and 111 
! L L 
1 1 be honest with you (ei*a of side one). 
1 2 OFFICER WIHONGL - to me that your dispatcher did 
1 3 a good job, but it sounds to me like you interpreted it 
1 4 wrong. Does that make sense? 1 
1 5 PEAK ALARM: No, because thafs how they told me. I 
1 6 Like I said, they said that - in fact they used the I 
1 7 word this lady is panicking. Thafs how it was told to J 
1 8 me, was that this lady was panicking and I heard it 1 
I 9 from two dispatchers that were, one that sat next to 1 
1 1 0 the other person. They both used the word panicking. 1 
1 11 OFFICER WIHONGI: Okay. And like I say, there's a 
1 12 lot have different people. I'm the initial officer on I 
1 13 this case. 1 
14 PEAK ALARM: And thafs fine. 
15 OFFICER WIHONGI: But I-there may have-that 1 
1 16 information may have been relayed to you. There may 1 
1 17 have been some problems with me as the officers. I I 
18 dont think so. The responding officers, we responded 1 
19 on exactly what was dispatched. May be a problem with I 
20 Salt Lake dispatch or, and youVe pretty much said hey, 1 
21 I assumed. And you used that little acronym there. So 1 
22 what I'm going to d o - 1 
23 PEAK ALARM: Un*huh. 
24 OFFICER WIHONGI: Like I said, Pve given you the I 
25 case number sir. I will go ahead and forward it on to 1 
32 
1 all our people and because there's, apparently there's 1 
2 different definitions of different alarms and whatnot, 1 
3 well have them make the decision. But this I do know J 
4 for sure. 1 
5 PEAK ALARM: And let me say this. If we're even J 
6 charged for a false alarm, I don't care. I was just - 1 
7 hey, charge us if you have to, well be glad to pay it 1 
8 I was just worried about this person being in danger. 1 
9 Does that make sense? 1 
10 OFFICER WIHONGL- Okay. 1 
11 PEAK ALARM: I don't even mind paying a fine if I 1 
12 have to. 1 
13 OFFICER WIHONGL Well, I'm not - you know, I'm not J 
14 the fine police or anything like that. I'm just- 1 
15 when people make assumptions, we just go off whatever 1 
16 the assumptions are. They could be good or they could 1 
17 be bad, and a lot of times - sometimes it is good to 1 
18 over assume something, but we need to make sure that 1 
19 we're both professional organizations, 1 mean the 1 
20 police department and Peak Alarm, and that we make sure 1 
21 that we question our people because the officers 1 
22 responding, they need up-to-date information, and they I 
23 need accurate information. 1 
24 PEAK ALARM: Coned. Now, I hope the only thing 1 
25 that I said that I assumed was who made the visual 1 
m 
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1 1 verification* And that was-
1 2 OFFICER WIHONGfc But you did ten dispatch that 
1 3 there was a guard on scene- Did you tell dispatch that 
1 4 the guard saw the people or were chasing the people, or 
I 5 he was requesting police or anything like that? 
1 6 PEAK ALARM: We had visual confirmation, and there 
1 7 are people in the building. 
1 8 OFHCER WfflONGfc Yes, sir. 
1 9 PEAK ALARM: But 1 assumed it was our guard that 
1 10 made that visual confirmation, not an employee of Salt 
( 11 Lake City School That was my mistake. And then 
1 13 confirmation. I just assumed it was our guard rather 
1 14 than an actual employee. So I just wanted to make that 
I 15 distinction there. 
116 OFHCER WfflONGfc Okay. 
1 17 PEAK ALARM: Does that make sense? But I did know 
18 that we did have visual confirmation that there was 
19 unauthorized people in the building. 
20 OFHCER WIHONGfc Okay. Do you have any questions 
21 for me at all, Jeff? 
22 PEAK ALARM. No, that sounds good. 
23 OFHCER WfflONGfc Okay. 
24 PEAKALARM: Hey,likelsay-
25 OFHCER WfflONGfc If Vm out there, and HI now 
34 
1 tell you this, I get real busy. If you could just have i 
2 that recording close and if I need to bring out a tape 
3 I can do that But it may get so busy today that I may 
4 not be able to get out there. If you could just hold 
5 that if anyone from our alarm department, alarms 
6 division contacts you, okay? 
7 PEAK ALARM: Like Shanna or somebody? 
8 OFHCER WIHONGfc Oh, you know Shanna? 
9 PEAK ALARM Yep. I know her very well. 
10 OFHCER WIHONGfc Shanna's the contact 
11 PEAK ALARM In fact she'll probably be surprised 
12 about this, but anyway. I 
13 OFHCER WIHONGfc Shanna1* the contact person over J 
14 here and- 1 
15 PEAK ALARM Yep, I know her very welL So if she I 
16 needs to contact me or whatever and I know her E-mail J 
17 address so I might even just send this off to her. 1 
18 OFHCER WIHONGfc You know what, I'm not even going 1 
19 to come out Why don't you do that, why don't you just 1 
20 send that straight to Shanna, that sounds like a better 1 
21 problem. 1 
22 PEAK ALARM: And 111 probably send her out all the 1 
23 different recordings. 1 
24 OFHCER WfflONGfc Un-huh. 1 
25 PEAK ALARM And so she can listen (inaudible) know J 
35_L 
1 1 her. 1 
I 2 OFHCER WIHONGfc ilie more information the better, 
1 3 absolutely. 
I 4 PEAK ALARM: Sounds good. 
1 5 OFHCER WIHONGfc And you know what I said, just try 
1 6 and get that definition with Shanna. Now, if Pm wrong 
1 7 about that definition on what a panic alarm is, then-
I 8 PEAKALARM: What is your interpretation of it? 
1 9 OFHCER WfflONGfc My interpretation is someone needs 
1 10 help ASAP. Thete's a weapon involved, someone is in 1 
1 11 imminent jeopardy. The panic alarm is the same ( 
I 12 priority as a robbery alarm at a bank going off. 1 
1 13 PEAKALARM: A hold-up, okay. 
J 14 OFHCER WIHONGfc Or a hold-up alarm, exactly. A 
1 15 panic alarm and a hold-up alarm are the same thing. 1 
1 16 And the reason why it's (Afferent than just a burglary I 
1 17 alarm because tactically the responding officers do it 1 
18 a little different If that kind of makes sense and I 1 
1 19 wont go too much into tactics. J 
20 PEAKALARM* That's fine. 1 
21 OFHCER WIHONGfc But a panic alarm is a (inaudible) 1 
22 alarm, handled tadicaUy differently than a burglary 1 
23 alarm is handled. J 
24 PEAKALARM: Let me ask you this then. What would 
25 you call a situation where, lefs say you had a 1 
36 
1 resident call up from her house, a lady home alone and 1 
2 she thinks she saw someone outside in her yard in the 1 
3 bushes. 1 
4 OFHCER WIHONGfc Thaf s a prowler alarm, we 1 
5 wouldn't handle it as a panic alarm. We would handle 1 
6 it as a prowler and we would approach it tactically the 1 
7 same as a burglar alarm. Does that make sense? 1 
8 PEAK ALARM: And I think the alarm industry, I've I 
9 actually been in the alarm business 10, IS years, they I 
10 would view that as a panic, which is separate from a 1 
11 hold-up. Does that make sense? And maybe that's where J 
12 a lot of the confusion is. 1 
13 OFHCER WfflONGfc Someone is hiding in the bushes? I 
14 PEAKALARM Because rather than making the phone 1 
15 call into the police department, lefs say they just 1 
16 hit a panic button, cuz that's what happens. 1 
17 OFHCER WfflONGfc Now if they hit a panic button, no 
18 one can decipher exactly what that is, do you 1 
19 understand me? Because there's no contact over the 
20 phone. Then officers will respond on a panic alarm. 1 
21 Thafs different tactically than just a prowler in the 1 
22 area. 1 
23 PEAK ALARM: Okay, that makes sense. I can 1 
24 understand your interpretation as well and that 1 
25 actually helps me a lot Okay. Well, let's do that J 
37] 
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And like I say 111 just go ahead send those. 
OFFICER WIHONGL' Just - you know what Fm not 
even going to come out there at alL To be honest with 
you, we've been real busy today and that would help out 
a lot more if you just sent that right to Shanna, as 
much information that you can. Ill have in my report 
the information on the lady down there at the scene and 
her written statement 
PEAK ALARM: Okay. 
OFFICER WIHONGt And then dispatch, IVe called 
back over there and those folks are going to do a 
little report and well send it over there just to make 
sure everybody's on the, you know, the right path. 
PEAK ALARM: Yeah, and I dont want to waste any 
more of your of your time. 
OFFICER WIHONGI: Sounds good, thank you. 
PEAK ALARM: Thank you so much. Take care. 
OFFICER WIHONGt Un-huh. 
PEAK ALARM: Bye. 
(End of tape) 
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MS.HOYT:A > t 
PEAK ALARM: AMghty. 
MS.HOttiOkay,bye. 
Pause 
UNIDENTIFIED: Hello? 
PEAK ALARM: Yeah, this is Brook with Peak Alarm. 
Is Bill in? 
UNIDENTIFIED: No, he's not 
PEAK ALARM: Okay, thank you. 
UNIDENTIFIED: Un-huh. 
(Call made, ringing). 
MACHINE: Your call has been forward to an automatic 
voice message system. Phil Bradly is not available. 
At the tone please record your message. 
(End of recording.) 
40 
1 CD ROM CALL FROM HOYT 
2 PEAK ALARM: Hi this is Brook, can I help you? 
3 MS. HOYT: Hi We just had two people walk in and 
4 walk upstairs and set the alarm off. 
5 PEAK ALARM: Okay, what's your name? 
6 MS. HOYT: Ifs Dianne Hoyt 
7 PEAK ALARM: Okay, so everything is. okay? 
8 MS. HOYT: Yeah. 
9 PEAK ALARM: Okay. 
10 MS. HOYT: But I have no idea who the kids were that 
11 came in. 
12 PEAK ALARM: Oh really, they just walked in there 
13 and started setting it off, huh? 
14 MS. HOYT: Yeah. 
15 PEAK ALARM: Are they still in there or did they 
16 leave? 
17 MS. HOYT: They are still in here I guess. They 
18 went upstairs, upstairs. 
119 PEAK ALARM: Yeah, we're getting it on the second 
20 floor, on the north media stairs. 
21 MS. HOYT: So we dont even know who they are. 
22 PEAK ALARM: Okay. Do you want me to dispatch 
23 police or what do you want me to do. 
24 MS. HOYT: You know, I would, just to get them. 
25 PEAK ALARM: Okay. 
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SALT LAKE POLICE DEPARTMENT I 
GO SL 2003-108471 (INACTIVE) 5399 - 1 PUB PEACE-FALSE FIRE ALARM 
General Offense Information 
Operational status INACTIVE 
Reported on Jun-27-2003 (Fri) 1040 
Occurred on Jun-27-2003 (FrL) 0857 
Approved on JuJ-14-2003 (Mon.) by F45 - Bryant, James F (Retired) 
Report submitted by J17 - Wihongi, Shaun 
Org unit Pioneer Patrol/B/Day 
Accompanied by K17 - Hanks, Kristopher 
Located at 241 N 300 W 
Municipality Salt Lake City Proper County CncI Dist 3 
District 1 Beat 111 Grid CAH 
Offenses (Completed/Attempted) 
Offense #1 5399 -1 PUB PEACE-FALSE FIRE ALARM - COMPLETED 
Location School/College 
Suspect used Not Applicable 
Offense #2 2299 -98 BURG ALARM-CAUSE UNKN - COMPLETED 
Location School/College 
Suspect used Not Applicable 
General Offense Information (cont'd) 
Bias None (no bias) 
Gang involvement None/Unknown 
Family violence NO 
LBR Clearance status Not Applicable 
Related Event(s) 
CF SL2003-108471 
AB SL2003-11018 
COMPLAINT INFORMATION 
Incident Location 
Address 241 N 300 W 
District 1 Beat 111 Grid CAH 
General Information I 
i 
Case type BURGLARY IN PROGRESS Priority 1 J 
TIME-Disp 08:59:47 Enroute 09:00:08 At Scene 09:01:58 Clrd 10:40:00 I 
How call received TELEPHONE 
Complainant Information 
Name PEAK ALARM JEFF 
Home Telephone 801486-7231 
Remarks 
PER PEAK. JPER PEAK GUARD„JdAVE 2-3 KIDS^.2ND 
FLOOR..BURG ALARM DROPPED AT 846 HRS.„ STSG IN 
FRONT..IN UNIFORM 
A120/32 COPIES 
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SALT LAKE P O L I C E D E P A R T M E N T i 
GO SL 2003-108471 (INACTIVE) 5399 - 1 PUB P E A CE - F A L S E FERE ALARM 
D582 ENR ALSO..JHLAS A SET OF KEYS 
MOTORS ARRIVED IN THE REAR 
A468 HOLDING NAY CORNER 
A459 #4 CORNER 
N/SIDE DOORS... 2 TEENAGE GIRLS WENT INSIDE 
N/SIDE OF THE BUILDING ... SEND GUARD THERE WHEN THEY FIND 
HIM 
PER PEAK ALARM/ THERE IS NO PEAK GUARD ON SCENE/ IT WAS 
ACTUALLY THE TEACHERS WHO CALLED PEAK ALARM. 
F JUV WALKING IN FRONT DOOR/ AI23 WITH HER 
Clearance Information 
Final Case type • BURGLAR ALARM - CAUSE UNKNOWN 
Report expected NO Founded YES 
Cleared by . INVESTIGATION CONTINUING 
Reporting Officer! J17 - Wihongi, Sharm 
Related Person(s) 
Case Specific : Arrestee - 01 HOWE, MICHAEL JEFFREY 
Caucasian/White MALE 
Bora on Nov~19-1975 
Residing at 3240 E SEVEN SPRINGS DR, SANDY , Utah 84092-
Occupation SUPERVISOR 
Employed by PEAK ALARM CO. 1534 S. GLADIOLA SLC, UT 
Reference Master Name Index 
HOWE, MICHAEL JEFFREY 
Unknown MALE 
Bora on Nov-19-1975 
Aliases HOWE, JEFF 
Linkage factors 
Resident status Non-Resident 
Offense 5399 - 1 PUB PEACE-FALSE FIRE ALARM - COMPLETED 
Arrest date Jnl-21-2003 (MOIL) 
Arrest type Misd Citation Issued 
Summons: 
M15389771MDMD76 9 105 
False fire alarm 
Disposition 
Case Specific : Witness - 01 HOYT, DIANNE 
Caucasian/White FEMALE 
Residing at 6358 W 4100 S , WEST VALLEY , Utah 
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SAL r LAKE POLICE DEPARTMENT J 
GO SL 2003-108471 (INACTIVE) 5399 -1 PUB PEACE-FALSE FIRE ALARM 
Phone Numbers 
Home (801)969-5410 
Occupation SUPERVISOR 
Employed by WEST HIGH CAFETERIA 
Reference Master Name Index 
HOYT, D1ANNE 
Caucasian/White FEMALE 
Born on Feb-13-1960 
Linkage factors 
Resident status Non-Resident 
Statement taken YES 
Related text page(s) 
Document SGT NARRATIVE 
Author F4 5 - Bryant, James F (Retired) 
Subject Jeff Howe 
Related date/time Jul-21-2003 1540 
I reviewed this case on 14 July 2003 as part of my supervisory 
responsibilities 
I noted that AP Jeff Howe had provided false information to SLCPD dispatch 
m order to get a police response to West High The false information 
provided was that an employee or agent of Peak Alarm was on the scene, and 
that the employee or agent either had contact with or knowledge of 
unauthorized persons on the premises 
Howe later stated to Officer Wihongi that he was dissatisfied with SLCPD's 
lack of response when Peak called m a burglar alarm He furtner stated 
"Whatever it takes, I thought this was a panic alarm" 
I subsequently reviewed this information with Associate City Prosecutor 
Holly Barrmgham This was not a formal screening, but she felt that the 
information I gave her met the elements of Utah code 76-9-105 She also 
said that either a formal screening or the issuance of a misdemeanor 
citation would be appropriate 
On 21 July 2003, Officer S Hunt and I met with AP Howe at Peak Alarm and 
issued misdemeanor citation # 15389771 
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SALT LAKE POLICE DEPARTMENT 
GO SL 2003-108471 (INACTIVE) 5399 - 1 PUB PEACE-FALSE FIRE ALARM 
Related text page(s) 
Document: INITIAL R/O 
Author: J17 - Wihongi, Shaun 
Related date/time: Jun-27-2003 1043 
WE RESPONDED TO WEST HIGH SCHOOL ON THE REPORT OF A BURGLARY IN PROGRESS. 
COMP, JEFF HOWE WITH PEAK ALARM STATED TO DISPATCH THAT A PEAK ALARM 
SECURITY GUARD WAS REQUESTING POLICE AT THE HIGH SCHOOL AND THAT THE GUARD 
HAD 2-3 KIDS ON THE 2ND LEVEL OF THE SCHOOL. 7 OFFICERS RESPONDED TO THE 
SCROOL. 4 PIONEER PATROL UNITS, 2 MOTOR UNITS AND THE HIGH SCHOOL RESOURCE 
DETECTIVE. DISPATCH STATED THAT THE PEAK ALARM OFFICER WOULD BE ON SCENE TO 
DIRECT. AS UNITS ARRIVED THEY WERE UNABLE TO LOCATE SECURITY. I REQUESTED 
THAT DISPATCH CONTACT PEAK ALARM AND HAVE THEM GET A LOCATION ON THERE 
OFFICER. DISPATCH STATED THAT PEAK ALARM WAS NOW STATING THAT A SECURITY 
OFFICER HAD NOT BEEN DISPATCHED TO THAT LOCATION AND THEY WOULD NOT BE 
SENDING ANYONE TO THE SCENE. WE CHECKED THE BUILDING AND FOUND THE SCHOOL 
SECURE. I CALLED COMP, JEFF HOWE (PEAK ALARM SUPERVISOR) AND ASKED HIM WHY 
SLCPD HAD BEEN GIVEN THE WRONG INFORMATION AND WHO THE ACTUAL COMP WAS. HE 
STATED THAT "SCHOOL TEACHER", DIANNE HOYT HAD CALLED PEAK ALARM DISPATCH 
STATING THAT 2 KIDS HAD WALKED INTO THE BUILDING AND THEY NEEDED 
SECURITY. JEFF STATED THAT DIANNE REQUESTED POLICE AND ASKED IF PEAK ALARM 
COULD SUMMON SLCPD. SLCPD DISPATCH ADVISED PEAK ALARM DISPATCHERS THAT WE 
DID NOT RESPOND ON BURGLARY ALARMS.AND THAT ON-SCENE VICTIMS MUST NOTIFY 
POLICE JEFF CALLED SLCPD DISPATCH AND REQUESTED POLICE TO THE SCENE AGAIN 
AND HE WAS THE COMP, REPORTING THAT HIS SECURITY OFFICER WAS ON-SCENE 
REQUESTING POLICE WHEN THAT IN FACT DID NOT OCCUR. WHEN I ASKED JEFF HOW HE 
RECEIVED THIS INFORMATION , HE STATED THAT HE WAS "LEAD TO BELIEVE" BY HIS 
DISPATCHER THAT PEOPLE (EMPLOYEES OF THE SALT LAKE SCHOOL DISTRICT) WERE IN 
IMMINENT DANGER AND HE WAS NOT HAPPY WITH SLCPD FOR NOT SENDING ANYONE TO 
THE SCENE. JEFF ADMITTED TO ME THAT HE HAD MADE ASSUMPTIONS . WHEN I ASKED 
HIM WHY HE MADE THE STATEMENTS TO DISPATCH HE STATED "WHATEVER IT TAKES , I 
THOUGHT THIS WAS A PANIC ALARM" . I EXPLAINED TO JEFF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 
A BURGLARY ALARM AND A PANIC ALARM AND HOW OFFICERS RESPOND DIFFERENTLY. I 
CONTACTED THE INITIAL COMP, DIANNE HOYT (SCHOOL LUNCH ROOM SUPERVISOR) WHO 
STATED THAT SHE DID CALL PEAK ALARM AND THAT IT WAS PEAK ALARM THAT 
SUGGESTED POLICE BE CALLED NOT HER. SHE ALSO STATED THAT AT NO TIME DID HER 
OR HER STAFF WHO WERE ON SCENE FELL THAT THEY WERE IN EMINENT DANGER. I 
TALKED WITH JEFF AGAIN ON THE PHONE AND HE APOLOGISED FOR THE 
MISCOMMUNICATION STATING THAT HE WOULD SPEAK WITH HIS DISPATCH. HE TOLD ME 
THAT IT WOULD BE FINE IF PEAK ALARM WAS FINED. NFD 
For. WS0627 Friday May 6, 2005 Page: 4 of 7 
1724 
SALT LAKE POLICE DEPARTMENT | 
GO SL 2003-108471 (INACTIVE) 5399 -1 PUB PEACE-FALSE FERE ALARM 
Related text pagefs) 
Document OTHER F/U 
Author 15H - Werner, Shanna 
Related date/time Jul-22-2003 
July 14, 2003 
I returned from a three week absence to receive a phone call from Sgt Jim 
Bryant and an office visit from Communications Supervisor Diane Powell 
advising me of an incident of emergency services abuse at West High School 
I due to false information given to police communications by Jeff Howe, the 
Central Station Manager of Peak Alarm 
I read police case 03-108471 and the initial officer's report by Officer 
Wihongi During my absence I had received an email from Jeff Howe with 
audio clips of phone conversations between Diane Hoyt, lunchroom worker for 
West High School and the Peak Alarm Dispatcher I listened to this audio 
clip several times Jeff had requested a return phone call from me After 
listening to the rationalization of his actions with Officer Wihongi, I 
felt a phone call to him would result m more of the rationalization and 
justification of which I had already heard The mistruth by Jeff Howe on 
the tape provided by dispatch was very evident and I felt listening to more 
rhetoric was unnecessary. I had experienced a similar untruth from Jeff 
Howe regarding an alarm at Cahoots (a business) several years ago Jeff 
had called me and tried to get an officer to respond on a burglar alarm 
signal, claiming the burglar was m the business and had answered the 
telephone No officer was dispatched and Jeff was advised to send one of 
Peak's guards The man turned out to be the owner of the business Sgt 
Jim Bryant advised me that it was unnecessary to warn Jeff Howe nor Peak 
Alarm of the pending citation 
July 15, 2003 - I spoke with Chuck Smith (phone 578-8361), Salt Lake City 
School District regarding case 03-108471 He stated that their contract 
with Peak Alarm only includes monitoring, not guard response Unknown why 
Jeff Howe would promise a Peak guard response to police communications, 
when correct protocol would have been to contact Chuck Smith or a 
responsible party at Salt Lake City School District West High received a 
false alarm fine m conjunction with this case for a false alarm where no 
emergency occurred 
July 21, 2003 - Sgt Jim Bryant cited Jeff Howe with a Class B Misdemeanor, 
Utah Code Section 76-9-105 - Making a false alarm 
II 00 - I received a call from the Salt Lake City Recorder She had an 
anonymous caller asking for a copy of the city code on false alarm 
information I informed her it was probably Peak Alarm calling and it was 
a state code, not a city code and faxed her a copy 
1400 hours - Jeff Howe called asking for Chief Dmse' s phone number 
1410 - I met with Assistant Chief Scott Folsom, Chief Dmse, and Lt 
Burbank summarizing the West High School situation 
15 00 - Jerry Howe, owner of Peak Alarm and father of Jeff Howe called 
asking why I had not replied to Jeff's email requesting I call him I 
explained to him that the mistruth by Jeff Howe on the tape provided by 
dispatch was very evident and I felt more rhetoric was unnecessary He 
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SALT LAKE POLICE DEPARTMENT 
1 GO SL 2003-108471 (INACTIVE) 
1 s t a t e d 
I t ape 
15 30 -
c a l l 
t h a t he and h i s a t t o r n e y want 
I r e f e r r e d him t o Lt Bur/bank 
- I con tac t ed Sgt James Bryant 
5399 
copies of 
, a d v i s i n g 
-1 PUB PEACE-FALSE FIRE ALARM 
the p o l i c e communications 
him of J e r r y Howe ' s phone 
Related text page(s) 
Document: ASSTG FIELD STOP 
Author: J17 - Wihongi, Shaun 
Related date/time.- Jun-27-2003 1508 
PLEASE NOTE THAT PEAK ALARM WAS RECEIVING ALARM DROPS (INTERIOR MOTION) FROM 
THE BUILDING DURING THE TIME OF THE DISPATCHED INCIDENT AND AUDIBLE ALARMS 
HAD BEEN ACTIVATED IN THE BUILDING DIANE WHO WAS ON SCENE WITH HER STAFF 
DID NOT SEE THE 2 FEMALE JUVENILES ENTER BUT WAS TOLD THAT INFORMATION BY 
ONE OF HER STAFF. 
Related Property Report 
Report Information 
Report Number 03108471 
Property case status PERSONAL/SAFEKEEPING 
Submitted on Jul-28-2003 (Mori.) by Werner, Shanna 
Offense GO SL 2003-108471 
Insurance letter received NO 
Related items 1 
Article - Evidence 
item #: 
Status. PERS/SAF Tag# 03108471-1 
Article. AUDIO DISK 
Make- MAXELL VR 
Model #• # of Pieces. 
Ser. #: 03108471 OAN 
Value* Color 
Description: TWO MAXELL UR AUDIO TAPES 
Recovered Date: Recovered Value: 
Recovered Location 
Flags: *e 
Arrest Information 
Status CHARGED 
Type of arrest Misd Citation issued 
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SALT LAKE POLICE DEPARTMENT 
GO SL 2003-108471 (INACTIVE) 5399 -1 PUB PEACE-FALSE FERE ALARM 
Reason for arrest Other 
Arrest date Jtm-27-2003 (Fn.) 0900 
Arrest agency S.JLC.PD 
Arresting officers F45 - Bryant, James F (Retired) 
Summary of facts 
M O MAKING FALSE ALARM 
Arrest Location 
Civic address 315 E 200 S 
Municipality Salt Lake City Proper County Cnci Dist 4 
District 2 Beat 212 Grid CEC 
Arrest Identification 
Arrest number 11018 
Arrestee Information 
Case screened NO Notify Victim on release NO Juvenile NO 
Diversion recommended NO 
Interpreter needed NO 
Rights given NO 
Mental exam required NO 
S tatement taken N O 
Fingerprinted NO Photo taken NO CD updated YES 
Family notified NO 
Lawyer called NO Meal given NO Coffee given NO Detained NO 
Arrestee's occupation SUPERVISOR 
Related General Offense 
GOSL 2003-108471 
Related Arrestee 
Arrestee HOWE, MICHAEL JEFFREY 
Born on Nov-19-1975 
** END OF HARDCOPY ** 
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STEPHEN G. CLARK, L.c. 
1 3 1 1 EAST 4 Q D S O U T H 
S A L T L A K E C I T Y , U T A H B 4 1 D 2 
P H . ( B D 1 ) 5 B 2 - 6 9 9 5 
FAX ( B D 1 ) 5 B Z - 6 5 D 4 
June 25,2004 
VIA HAND DELIVERY 
RECEIVED 
JUN 2 5 200* 
CITY RECORDER 
Kendrick Cowley, Recorder 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION 
451 South State Street, Room 415 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Notice of Claim Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 63-30-11(2): 
Peak Alarm, Jerry D. Howe and Michael Jeffrey Howe v. Salt Lake City 
Corporation, Shanna Werner, RicDinse, James Bryant and Dwayne Baird 
Dear Salt Lake City Recorder: 
I have been retained to represent Peak Alarm, Jerry D. Howe and Michael Jeffrey Howe 
in connection with a claim of unlawful conduct by Salt Lake City Corporation and one or more 
of its officers, agents, representatives or employees. This letter is a Notice of Claim pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated § 63-30-11(2). 
Statement of Facts: 
Peak Alarm is a family-owned Salt Lake company. Its more than 250 employees provide 
private security services throughout the State of Utah, working as an adjunct to public safety 
officials. Peak Alarm was founded in 1969 by Jerry Howe. Jerry has over 40 years of 
experience in the industry. His goal in founding Peak Alarm was to establish a company that 
would pjovide the highest quality of professionalism and service. Peak Alarm has been in 
business for 35 years, has established an excellent reputation, now passing to a new generation 
including Jerry's sons, for providing reliable, professional security services. 
Peak Alamo has always pursued a strong working relationship with law enforcement 
based on cooperation and mutual respect. As detailed below, however, Salt Lake City, its Police 
Department and particularly its Alarm Administrator, Sharuia Werner, have sought to tarnish that 
reputation and destroy that relationship through increasingly aggressive, unwarranted and 
ultimately unlawful and unconstitutional conduct. 
Peak Alarm and others in the alarm industry in Utah and nationwide provide valuable 
services, including alarm installation and on-site and remote monitoring. Alarms occasionally go 
off by mistake or under other circumstances not involving a genuine emergency. Peak Alarm 
and others in the industry have worked hard to reduce the number of such "false alarms," and 
have developed and identified a number of sensible measures that can benefit both public and 
private entities and employees charged with ensuring the public safety. At the same time, Peak 
Alarm and others have opposed measures that impose burdensome or unworkable requirements 
on public and private entities and employees and unreasonable risks on the public, without a 
corresponding public benefit. One such measure is the "no-response" ordinance. 
"No-response" ordinances typically prevent law enforcement from responding to a 
private alarm unless the alarm is visually corroborated or otherwise "verified" in some fashion. 
The alarm industry's general position is that "no-response" ordinances are at best ineffective and 
can even derogate from important community efforts to increase public safety by increasing the 
risk that genuine emergencies will not be addressed in a timely fashion. 
Michael Jeffrey Howe, known as Jeff Howe, is Jerry Howe's son and Peak Alarm's 
Central Station Manager. His responsibilities as Central Station Manager include managing 
proper dispatch in response to alarm signals and reducing the number of false alarms. His 
position requires that he be licensed by the State. His license can be revoked if he is convicted of 
a crime. 
Besides his responsibilities as Peak Alarm's Central Station Manager, he has also served 
since early 2003 as Chairman of the No-Response Committee for the Utah Alarm Association, 
an industry association that seeks to maximize the public benefit that can be obtained from 
strong communication and coordination between public safety and private security entities and 
employees. The No-Response Committee was formed in 2001 to articulate and advocate the 
alarm industry's position on the important public safety issues that arise when municipalities 
consider adopting "no-response" ordinances. Those issues are multifarious but center on 
whether the public interest is well-served by "no-response" ordinances or whether other means 
of insuring proper coordination between public safety officials and private security concerns 
better serve the public interest. 
In his capacity as Chairman of the No-Response Committee, Jeff has been a highly 
visible, articulate and effective spokesperson for the alarm industry's position on those important 
issues. Jeff appeared, publicly identified himself as a representative of Peak Alarm and the 
alarm industry, and spoke at a meeting of the Murray City Municipal Council on June 10, 2003, 
at which the subject of "no-response" ordinances was discussed. Jeff expressed the alarm 
industry's, Peak Alarm's and his own views in opposition to "no-response" ordinances. 
Salt Lake City, acting principally through Shanna Werner, the Alarm Administrator for 
the City, has developed, has adopted and publicly advocates a position on "no-response" 
ordinances that differs from that of the alarm industry. Salt Lake City itself adopted such an 
ordinance in 2002, and both individually and in her official capacity Ms. Werner has urged that 
other communities in Utah and across the country adopt "no-response" ordinances. Ms. Werner, 
Sgt. James Bryant and other representatives of Salt Lake City also appeared and spoke at the 
above meeting of the Murray City Municipal Council, expressing their views in support of "no-
response" ordinances. 
To the extent Salt Lake City and Ms. Wenier have advocated their position vigorously 
tlirough proper channels and with reference to facts, they have been within their rights to express 
a viewpoint on an important public policy subject. Mr. Howe and other industry spokespersons 
have similarly been within their rights to advocate their differing viewpoint on the same subject. 
Peak Alarm and Mr. Howe are committed to the public process and are confident that when the 
facts are presented and vigorous but fair advocacy airs competing viewpoints, the public interest 
is served. Salt Lake City and its officers, agents and employees, and particularly Ms. Werner, 
have gone well beyond what is legally and constitutionally appropriate. 
Rather than present the City's and her own point of view in support of "no-response" 
ordinances in public hearings and with the facts, Ms. Wenier, acting at the behest and with the 
support of the police department, has mounted a wideranging and public campaign that features 
exaggerated, misleading and/or false statements against the alarm industry itself and individuals 
within the industry. For example, in media interviews, Ms. Wenier has sought to paint the entire 
alarm industry with a broad and damaging brush by relating isolated anecdotes involving the 
alleged practices of a few companies: 
H In comments published by KSL on or about April 22, 1999, Ms. Werner 
characterized the entire alarm industry as "preying on [the] fears" of senior citizens, 
"selling them this alarm system as the panacea for all ills." 
• In a letter to the editor published in the Salt Lake Tribune on or about March 15, 
2000, Ms. Wenier criticized a paid ad by the Utah Alann Association as using 
"tactics typical of this industry to scare, bully, threaten." 
H In comments published by the Wall Street Journal on or about April 28, 2000, Ms. 
Wenier cited alleged incidents where an alarm company sold an alann to an elderly 
blind woman who frequently set off the "panic" button when she meant to turn on 
her system, and incurred heavy fines; a salesman told a homeowner his young 
daughters could "disappear" if he didn't buy a security system; and a company 
continued to charge monitoring fees to a homeowner after he had sold his house, 
and then charged the same fees to the buyer, too. Ms. Warner concluded: "As far as 
I'm concerned, this whole alann business is a scam." 
H In a letter that appeared in the June 2002 issue of Security Sales magazine, Ms. 
Werner staled: "It is so common within the alarm industry for emotion to lake 
control and a 'smoke-aiid-min'ors' approach to be used in an attempt to cloud the 
issue." 
• In an October 2, 2002 email published to various third parties, Ms. Wenier alleged 
that an industry spokesperson had "grossly misrepresented the burglary statistics for 
Salt Lake City Police Department" and threatened that publication of the 
spokesperson's presentation "will result in litigation." Ms. Wenier subsequently 
sent emails to third persons throughout the United States warning them "to be 
cautious in spreading the false statistics." In fact, the presentation referred to, 
entitled "Effective Alarm Management/' was based on statistics obtained directly 
from the Salt Lake City Police Department website. 
• In comments published by a Savannah newspaper on or about December 22, 2002, 
Ms. Werner contended: "They [the alarm industry] like to have free emergency 
response, with no responsibility but to rake in that monthly monitoring fee." 
• In comments published in an industry newsletter in July 2003, Ms. Werner is quoted 
as stating: "This is an industry that is in complete denial about the reality of false 
alarms." 
• In a letter dated April 30, 2003, on Salt Lake City Corporation Police Department 
letterhead, addressed to Utah Attorney General Mark Shurtleff, Ms. Werner alleged 
that the alarm industry was attempting to engage in a "conspiracy" with an 
insurance company involving "a plot to penalize their customers and other citizens" 
for their own "political and economic gains." Ms. Werner went on to allege that the 
conspirators sought "to defraud their customers in an attempt to force police to 
resume responding to an alarm signal that was 99.7% false." 
Ms. Werner has also targeted Peak Alarm specifically. By letter dated March 21, 2002, 
on Salt Lake City Corporation Police Department letterhead, Ms. Werner addressed a Peak 
Alarm customer, encouraging it to "consider selecting another company who will do a better job 
for you." 
The purpose and effect of this campaign has been to unfairly and seriously malign Peak 
Alarm and the entire alarm industry and, as a result, to threaten the existing contracts and future 
business prospects of Peak Alarm and others in the industry, and to send a chill over the 
expression of legitimate viewpoints on an important matter of public interest. 
Ms. Werner, Sgt. Bryant and others acting in their individual and official capacities on 
behalf of Salt Lake City have taken even more aggressive action in their campaign, crossing the 
line from vigorous advocacy and misleading statements to more patently illegal and 
unconstitutional actions. Specifically, having determined to find a case to charge and prosecute 
as a "false alarm" in furtherance of their anti-security industry campaign, they targeted Jeff 
Howe and Peak Alarm. On July 25, 2003, just weeks after Jeff Howe's public presentation at the 
Murray City Council meeting, Salt Lake City filed a criminal information against Jeff Howe, 
alleging he had committed the criminal offense of violating the Utah State Code, Section 76-9-
105(1), by making a false alarm - a crime punishable by up to six months in jail and a fine of up 
to $1000 plus an 85% surcharge. This charge not only threatened Jeffs licensure and ability to 
pursue his livelihood, but also was intended to send and did send a broader, chilling message. 
The charge arose out of the following incident, as set forth in Findings of Fact entered by 
Judge Paul Iwasaki of the Salt Lake City Justice Court on May 4, 2004. Peak has a contract with 
the Salt Lake City School District pursuant to which Peak provides certain security services for 
District schools, including West High School. These services include the use of remote motion 
sensoring alarms. On June 27, 2003, when school was not in session and no unauthorized 
individuals were permitted on the premises, certain of the motion sensoring alarms were 
activated at West High. Shortly thereafter, Diane Hoyt, an employee of the District, contacted 
Peak concerning the alarms, which could be heard on the dispatch recording. She informed 
Peak's dispatcher that there were two individuals in the school who had activated the alarms and 
they were not authorized to be on the premises. She did not know who the persons were or what 
their intentions were. When Peak's dispatcher asked if Ms. Hoyt wanted her to dispatch the Salt 
Lake City police, Ms. Hoyt answered in the affirmative. 
Peak's dispatcher contacted Salt Lake City Police Dispatch and informed it of the call 
from West High. The police dispatcher said Salt Lake Police would not respond to the call, even 
though there had been visual confirmation of the two individuals, unless the client itself made the 
call to Salt Lake City Police Dispatch. 
Shortly thereafter during the morning of June 27, 2003, Jeff Howe contacted Salt Lake 
City Police Dispatch requesting that the Salt Lake City Police respond to the alarm at West High, 
and informing police dispatch they had been unable to reestablish contact with the client. 
Shortly thereafter, several Salt Lake City Police officers arrived at West High and 
attempted to intercede with what may have been a burglary in progress. However, the two 
individuals reportedly inside West High had apparently exited the building by the time the police 
arrived. At least, the police were unable to locate them. However, the Salt Lake City police 
officer in charge of the investigation spoke with Ms. Hoyt who again confirmed that two 
unauthorized individuals had entered the premises and set off the alarms. 
Summarizing the incident, Judge Iwasaki found as follows upon trial of the false alarm 
charge: 
The witnesses and evidence presented by the City established that there was an 
alarm at West High School, there were two unauthorized individuals on the 
premises of West High School which caused the alarm, and that no one knew 
what was the intent of the individuals, including whether they intended to cause a 
theft or commit a felony while in the West High School premises, and that Mrs. 
Hoyt had asked for police assistance in removing the individuals from the 
premises. The evidence presented above was undisputed. 
None of the evidence presented by the City established Mr. Howe's intent at the 
time he contacted Salt Lake City Police dispatch, nor was there any evidence 
presented by the City to establish that Mr. Howe knowingly or intentionally made 
false representations to Salt Lake City dispatch. 
Based on the foregoing facts, Judge Iwasaki concluded: 
1. The City has failed to produce any evidence establishing criminal intent. 
2. The City has not met the necessary elements to prove Mr. Howe violated Utah 
Code Ann. §76-9-105(1). 
3. There has been no evidence presented that Mr. Howe knowingly or intentionally 
made false representations to Salt Lake City dispatch or made a false alarm as 
defined by Code Ann. § 76-9-105(1). 
4. Accordingly, the defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict is hereby granted. 
Ms. Werner and others acting in coordination with her or at her behest and on behalf of 
Salt Lake City were unconcerned with and unconstrained by the facts or the law in bringing and 
pursuing this charge. Ms. Werner reported that she had returned from a three-week absence to 
receive a phone call from Sgt. Bryant and an office visit from Communications Supervisor Diane 
Powell advising her of the above incident. Ms. Werner immediately characterized the incident as 
one involving "emergency services abuse at West High School due to false information given to 
police communications by Jeff Howe, the Central Station Manager of Peak Alarm." She also 
reported that Jeff Howe had sent her an email about the incident with audio clips of the relevant 
conversations and had requested a return call. She declined, however, to contact Mr. Howe or 
otherwise to further investigate the incident: "After listening to the rationalization of his actions 
with Officer Wihongi [one of the Salt Lake City police officers who responded to the incident], I 
felt a phone call to him would result in more of the rationalization and justification of what I had 
already heard. The mistruth [sic] by Jeff Howe on the tape provided by dispatch was very 
evident and I felt listening to more rhetoric was unnecessary." 
At Ms. Werner's and Sgt. Bryant's urging, the full power of the Salt Lake Police 
Department and the Salt Lake City Prosecutor's Office was brought to bear against Jeff Howe. 
In a virtually unprecedented display, not only was a citation issued, but Sgt Bryant himself, along 
with another Salt Lake City Police officer, personally served the citation on Jeff Howe at Peak 
Alarm. Ms. Werner viewed the charge and the subsequent prosecution as a way to send a 
message to the broader industry that she had long targeted and tarred with broad-brush, unfair 
and slanderous comments. She was able to convince both the Police Department and the City 
Prosecutor's Office to vigorously pursue the case, not for the puipose of enforcing the criminal 
laws, but for the purpose of seeking to punish Mr. Howe for doing his job and exercising his 
constitutional rights. The Security System News reported that while she declined to discuss the 
specifics of the case, she "hoped Howe would be found guilty": "'I'm hoping for the 
enforcement of our ordinance [under which Jeff Howe was not even charged] that it goes well,' 
she said. 'If the jury lets Peak Alarm off the hook, to me that's a signal to other alarm companies 
to call Salt Lake City police and tell them whatever they want.'" 
Nature of the Claim: 
The above-described conduct gives rise to several claims and causes of action against 
Salt Lake City and its officers, agents or employees, collectively referred to below as Salt Lake 
City. Those claims and causes of action arise under both federal and state statutes and the 
common law, and include: 
• False arrest and/or false imprisonment, in that Salt Lake City caused Jeff Howe to be 
arrested when no reasonable and prudent person acting in good faith would be 
justified in believing facts existed that would warrant the making of an arrest. 
• Malicious prosecution, in that Salt Lake City caused a criminal proceeding to be 
initiated and continued against Jeff Howe, the proceeding was terminated in his favor, 
there was no probable cause for the proceeding, and the primary purpose was other 
than that of bringing the alleged offender to justice. 
• Violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, 
and similar rights under the Utah Constitution, in that Salt Lake City intended to and 
did inhibit and punish the free exercise of rights granted under the United States and 
Utah Constitutions, causing damage to Jeff Howe, Peak Alarm and others by seeking 
to restrain them from expressing and advocating their viewpoint on the subject of 
"no-response" ordinances while Salt Lake City remained free to express and advocate 
its own competing viewpoint on the same subject, and by punishing them for 
expressing their viewpoint. 
• Violation of Utah's Citizen Participation in Government Act, in that Salt Lake City 
initiated and continued an action relating or in response to an act of Jeff Howe while 
participating in the process of government, without a substantial basis in fact or law, 
and for the purpose of harassing, intimidating, punishing, or otherwise maliciously 
inhibiting the free exercise of rights granted under the United States and Utah 
Constitutions, causing damage to Jeff Howe. 
• Tortious interference with existing and prospective employment and business 
relations, in that Salt Lake City knew of Jeff Howe's employment and Peak Alarm's 
existing and prospective business relations and intentionally or negligently interfered 
with those relations for improper purposes or through improper means, causing 
damage to Peak Alarm and to Jeff Howe. 
Out-of-Pocket Damages: 
Presently calculated: 
Legal Fees and Costs $24,261.00 fees 
Incurred in Defense of $ 1,452.72 costs 
Criminal Proceeding $25,713.72 total 
Lost wages: $ 7,500.00 
TOTAL $33,213.72 
In addition to out-of-pocket damages, Peak Alarm, Jerry Howe and Jeff Howe seek all 
other damages allowed by law in an amount currently unknown but believed to be not less than 
$100,000.00, plus punitive damages as may be appropriate based on the nature of the conduct 
alleged. They may also seek declaratory and injunctive relief as may be appropriate. 
In addition to the foregoing claims, Peak, as a taxpayer in Salt Lake City, is concerned 
about Ms. Werner's activities as a taxpayer-supported lobbyist against the alann industry, and 
about whether taxpayers are even receiving the value of the services she purports to provide in 
that capacity. Ms. Werner travels extensively in the conduct of the above-described campaign. 
For example, she sought and received permission to travel, at taxpayer expense, to the 7th Annual 
International Training Conference of FARA (the False Alarm Reduction Association) in New 
Orleans from April 14-18, 2003. Ms. Werner justified the public expense by stating: "The 
classes and networking I receive at this conference have proven to be invaluable in formulating 
our alann program. I am on the board of directors and will be a participant on a panel discussion 
on verified response." According to a special announcement issued by FARA, however, the 
FARA Board met at the end of the conference and unanimously approved the following motion: 
'To remove Shanna Werner as Secretary of FARA and Chairperson of the Quality Commitment 
Committee for neglect of duty in office." The motion resulted from "concern over the fact that 
Secretary Werner had missed a majority of the sessions held during the conference, including the 
Friday Board Meeting, without notifying anyone of a reason or need to miss the meetings." 
Peak requests that this and other similar incidents be investigated and addressed 
appropriately and that Peak and the public be provided with the results of the investigation. 
Attorney for Peak Alann 
Jerry D. Howe and 
Michael Jeffrey Howe 
SCC 
cc: Ed Rutan, Salt Lake Cily Attorney 
Jeiry D. Howe 
Jeff Howe 
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Kenneth A. Okazaki (USB #3844) 
Stephen C. Clark (USB #4551) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
170 South Main St., Ste. 1500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
Facsimile: (801) 328-0537 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PEAK ALARM COMPANY, INC., a Utah 
corporation; JERRY D. HOWE, an individual; 
and MICHAEL JEFFREY HOWE, an 
individual, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, a Utah 
municipal corporation; SHANNA WERNER, 
an individual; CHARLES F. "RICK" DINSE, 
an individual; SCOTT ATKINSON, an 
individual; JAMES BRYANT, an individual; 
and JOHN DOES I - X, individuals. 
Defendants. 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
(JURY TRIAL DEMANDED) 
Civil No. 050906433 
Judge L.A. Dever 
COME NOW Plaintiffs, by and through their undersigned counsel, and as and for their 
Amended Complaint against Defendants state and allege as follows: 
Nature of Action 
1. This is an action to remedy deprivations of rights secured under the United States 
and Utah Constitutions and other injuries to person and reputation at the hands of Salt Lake City 
Corporation and its employees. As detailed below, Salt Lake City, its Police Department and 
& 
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particularly its Alarm Administrator, Shanna Werner, adopted a policy and engaged in a course 
of conduct the purpose and effect of which were to stifle debate of an important public safety 
issue by silencing one side of that debate. Among their wrongful and malicious acts, they 
intentionally targeted Peak Alarm as a prominent presence and voice in the private security 
industry; tarred Peak Alarm and the industry generally with false charges of dishonesty and 
greed; arrested Peak Alarm's Central Station Manager on trumped-up criminal charges; and 
pursued a groundless criminal prosecution until it was dismissed as wholly without merit. 
Defendants have by their conduct maliciously tarnished Plaintiffs' reputation and interfered with 
Peak Alarm's existing and prospective business relationships. They have also caused Plaintiffs 
unnecessarily to incur legal fees and other damages. And they have systematically violated 
Plaintiffs' civil rights, causing substantial personal and reputational damage. At a minimum, 
Defendants have failed to properly train police officers and dispatchers in the meaning and 
application of ordinances and statutes pertaining to false alarms, proximately causing damages 
and injuries to Plaintiffs as set forth herein. Plaintiffs seek appropriate redress. 
Parties, Jurisdiction and Venue 
2. Plaintiff Peak Alarm Company, Inc. is a corporation organized and existing under 
the laws of the State of Utah, with its principal place of business in Salt Lake City, Utah. Peak 
Alarm is a family-owned Salt Lake company. Its more than 250 employees provide private 
security services to families, businesses and governmental entities throughout the State of Utah. 
It works closely with public safety officials and it enjoys an excellent working relationship with 
all of them, with the exception of Salt Lake City. Peak Alarm has been in business for more than 
35 years, and has established an excellent reputation for providing the highest quality of reliable, 
professional security services. 
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3. Plaintiff Jerry D. Howe ("Jerry Howe") is the founder and President of Peak 
Alarm. Jerry Howe is and at all relevant times was a resident of Salt Lake County, Utah. 
4. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff Michael Jeffrey Howe ("Jeff Howe") was 
the Central Station Manager of Peak Alarm. Jeff Howe is and at all relevant times was a resident 
of Salt Lake County, Utah. 
5. Defendant Salt Lake City Corporation is a municipality organized and existing 
under the laws of the State of Utah, and is a political subdivision therefore, which maybe sued in 
its own name pursuant to law. 
6. Defendant Shanna Werner is an individual employed by Salt Lake City as Alarm 
Coordinator, Management Services Division, Salt Lake City Police Department. In performance 
of her official duties, Werner acts under color of state law. She is sued in both her individual and 
official capacities. 
7. Defendant Charles F. "Rick" Dinse is an individual employed by Salt Lake City 
as Chief of Police. In performance of his official duties, Dinse acts under color of state law. He 
is sued in both his individual and official capacities. 
8. Defendant Scott Atkinson is an individual employed by Salt Lake City as 
Assistant Chief of Police. In performance of his official duties, Atkinson acts under color of 
state law. He is sued in both his individual and official capacities. 
9. Defendant James Bryant is employed by Salt Lake City as a police officer. In the 
performance of his official duties, Bryant acts under color of state law. He is sued in both his 
individual and official capacities. 
10. Defendant John Does I - X are individuals employed by Salt Lake City whose 
names are currently unknown. They are sued in both their individual and official capacities. 
7080m\l 
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11. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action matter under 
Utah Code Ann.§ 78-3-4 and Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-501. Venue is proper pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-13-2 and Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-502(3). 
12. Plaintiffs served a Notice of Claim pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 63-30-
11(2) on or about June 25, 2004, complying in all respects with the applicable requirements of 
the Governmental Immunities Act. Defendants acknowledged receipt of the Notice of Claim by 
letter dated June 28, 2004, promising to "investigate this matter and respond accordingly." Salt 
Lake City subsequently sought, and was granted, additional time beyond the deadline to 
investigate the matter. However, the City has not made Plaintiffs aware of the results of any 
investigation, nor has it provided any written response to Plaintiffs' Notice of Claim. 
General Allegations 
13. Peak Alarm and others in the alarm industry in Utah and nationwide provide 
valuable services, including alarm installation and on-site and remote monitoring. Alarms 
occasionally go off by mistake or under other circumstances not involving a genuine emergency. 
Peak Alarm and others in the industry have worked hard to reduce the number of such "false 
alarms," and have developed and identified a number of sensible measures that can benefit both 
public and private entities and employees charged with ensuring the public safety. 
14. At the same time, Peak Alarm and others have opposed measures that impose 
burdensome or unworkable requirements on public and private entities and employees and 
unreasonable risks on the public, without a corresponding public benefit. One such measure is 
the "no-response" ordinance. 
15. "No-response" ordinances typically prevent law enforcement from responding to 
a private alarm unless the alarm is visually corroborated or otherwise "verified" in some fashion. 
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The alarm industry's general position is that "no-response" ordinances are at best ineffective and 
can even derogate from important community efforts to increase public safety by increasing the 
risk that genuine emergencies will not be addressed in a timely fashion. 
16. Jeff Howe is Jerry Howe's son and was, at all times relevant hereto, Peak Alarm's 
Central Station Manager. His responsibilities as Central Station Manager included managing 
proper dispatch in response to alarm signals and reducing the number of false alarms. His 
position required that he be licensed by the State. His license can be revoked if he is convicted 
of a crime. 
17. Besides his responsibilities as Peak Alarm's Central Station Manager, Jeff Howe 
also served since early 2003 as Chairman of the No-Response Committee for the Utah Alarm 
Association, an industry association that seeks to maximize the public benefit that can be 
obtained from strong communication and coordination between public safety and private security 
entities and employees. The No-Response Committee was formed in 2001 to develop and 
publicly articulate and advocate the alarm industry's position on the important public safety 
issues that arise when municipalities consider adopting "no-response" ordinances. Those issues 
are multifarious but center on whether the public interest is well-served by "no-response" 
ordinances or whether other means of insuring proper coordination between public safety 
officials and private security providers better serve the public interest. In his capacity as 
Chairman of the No-Response Committee, Jeff Howe has been a highly visible, articulate and 
effective spokesperson for the alarm industry's position on those important issues. 
18. Salt Lake City, acting principally through Shanna Werner, the Alarm 
Administrator for the City, has developed, adopted and publicly advocated a position on "no-
response" ordinances that differs from that of Peak Alarm and the alarm industry. Ms. Werner 
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has not only concerned herself with Salt Lake City's "no-response" ordinance, but at the behest 
and with the support of Salt Lake City and other employees, has become a nationwide 
spokesperson for "no-response" ordinances and an anti-alarm-industry attack dog. Her tactics 
and methods have included the development and implementation of a wide-ranging public 
campaign that features exaggerated, misleading and/or false statements against the alarm 
industry itself and individuals within the industry. 
19. For example, in media interviews, Ms. Werner has consistently painted the entire 
alarm industry with a broad and damaging brush by relating isolated anecdotes involving the 
alleged practices of a few companies: 
a. In comments published by KSL on or about April 22, 1999, Ms. Werner 
characterized the entire alarm industry as "preying on [the] fears" of senior citizens, 
"selling them this alarm system as the panacea for all ills." 
b. In a letter to the editor published in the Salt Lake Tribune on or about March 15, 
2000, Ms. Werner criticized a paid ad by the Utah Alarm Association as using "tactics 
typical of this industry to scare, bully, threaten." 
c. In comments published by the Wall Street Journal on or about April 28, 2000, 
Ms. Werner cited alleged incidents where an alarm company sold an alarm to an elderly 
blind woman who frequently set off the "panic" button when she meant to turn on her 
system, and incurred heavy fines; a salesman told a homeowner his young daughters 
could "disappear" if he didn't buy a security system; and a company continued to charge 
monitoring fees to a homeowner after he had sold his house, and then charged the same 
fees to the buyer, too. Ms. Warner concluded: "As far as I'm concerned, this whole 
alarm business is a scam." 
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d. In a letter that appeared in the June 2002 issue of Security Sales magazine, 
Ms. Werner stated: "It is so common within the alarm industry for emotion to take 
control and a 'smoke-and-mirrors' approach to be used in an attempt to cloud the issue." 
e. In an October 2, 2002, email published to various third parties, Ms. Werner 
alleged that an industry spokesperson had "grossly misrepresented the burglary statistics 
for Salt Lake City Police Department" and threatened that publication of the 
spokesperson's presentation "will result in litigation." Ms. Werner subsequently sent 
emails to third persons throughout the United States warning them "to be cautious in 
spreading the false statistics." In fact, the presentation referred to, entitled "Effective 
Alarm Management," was based on statistics obtained directly from the Salt Lake City 
Police Department website. 
f. In comments published by a Savannah newspaper on or about December 22, 
2002, Ms. Werner contended: "They [the alarm industry] like to have free emergency 
response, with no responsibility but to rake in that monthly monitoring fee." 
g. In comments published in an industry newsletter in July 2003, Ms. Werner is 
quoted as stating: "This is an industry that is in complete denial about the reality of false 
alarms." 
h. In a letter dated April 30, 2003, on Salt Lake City Corporation Police Department 
letterhead, addressed to Utah Attorney General Mark Shurtleff, Ms. Werner alleged that 
the alarm industry was attempting to engage in a "conspiracy" with an insurance 
company involving "a plot to penalize their customers and other citizens" for their own 
"political and economic gains." Ms. Werner went on to allege that the conspirators 
sought "to defraud their customers in an attempt to force police to resume responding to 
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an alarm signal that was 99.7% false." The Attorney General's office investigated Ms. 
Werner's claims and concluded that "the facts on which [her] allegations were based are 
incorrect." It also specifically advised her "to forward a copy of [the Attorney General's 
response] to those people to whom you sent your original letter, so that the allegations in 
your letter will not stand uncorrected." On information and belief, Ms. Werner did not do 
so. 
20. Ms. Werner has also targeted Peak Alarm specifically. By letter dated March 21, 
2002, on Salt Lake City Corporation Police Department letterhead, Ms. Werner addressed a Peak 
Alarm customer, encouraging it to "consider selecting another company who will do a better job 
for you." 
21. The purpose and effect of this campaign have been to unfairly and seriously 
malign Peak Alarm and, as a result, to threaten the existing contracts and future business 
prospects of Peak Alarm, and to send a chill over the expression of legitimate viewpoints on an 
important matter of public interest. 
22. Ms. Werner, Sgt. Bryant and others acting in their individual and official 
capacities on behalf of Salt Lake City have taken even more aggressive action in their campaign, 
going well beyond vigorous advocacy and false and misleading statements to even more 
egregiously illegal and unconstitutional actions. Specifically, Defendants decided to find or 
create a situation based on which they could charge and prosecute a representative of the private 
security industry for making a "false alarm," hoping to send a powerful message that would stifle 
or silence opposition to their campaign for nationwide embrace of "no-response" ordinances and 
inflict other serious damage. In pursuit of that plan, they targeted Jeff Howe and Peak Alarm. 
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23. Defendants' targeting of Peak Alarm and Jeff Howe arose out of the following 
incident, as set forth in Findings of Fact entered by Judge Paul Iwasaki of the Salt Lake City 
Justice Court on May 4, 2004. 
a. Peak has a contract with the Salt Lake City School District pursuant to which 
Peak provides certain security services for District schools, including West High School. 
These services include the use of remote motion sensoring alarms. 
b. On June 27, 2003, when school was not in session and no unauthorized 
individuals were permitted on the premises, certain of the motion sensoring alarms were 
activated at West High. 
c. Shortly thereafter, Diane Hoyt, an employee of the District, contacted Peak 
concerning the alarms, which could be heard on the dispatch recording. She informed 
Peak's dispatcher that there were two individuals in the school who had activated the 
alarms and they were not authorized to be on the premises. She did not know who the 
persons were or what their intentions were. When Peak's dispatcher asked if Ms. Hoyt 
wanted her to dispatch the Salt Lake City police, Ms. Hoyt answered in the affirmative. 
d. Peak's dispatcher contacted Salt Lake City Police Dispatch and informed it of the 
call from West High. The police dispatcher said Salt Lake Police would not respond to 
the call, even though there had been visual confirmation of the two individuals, unless the 
client itself made the call to Salt Lake City Police Dispatch. 
e. Shortly thereafter during the morning of June 27, 2003, Jeff Howe contacted Salt 
Lake City Police Dispatch requesting that the Salt Lake City Police respond to the alarm 
at West High, and informing police dispatch they had been unable to reestablish contact 
with the client. 
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f. Shortly thereafter, several Salt Lake City Police officers arrived at West High and 
attempted to intercede with what may have been a burglary in progress. However, the 
two individuals reportedly inside West High had apparently exited the building by the 
time the police arrived. At least, the police were unable to locate them. However, the 
Salt Lake City police officer in charge of the investigation spoke with Ms. Hoyt who 
again confirmed that two unauthorized individuals had entered the premises and set off 
the alarms. 
24. Ms. Werner returned from a three-week absence to receive a phone call from 
Sgt. Bryant and an office visit from Communications Supervisor Diane Powell advising her of 
the above incident. Jeff Howe had sent Ms. Werner an email about the incident with audio clips 
of the relevant conversations and had requested a return call. Ms. Werner declined, however, to 
contact Mr. Howe or otherwise to further investigate the incident: "After listening to the 
rationalization of his actions with Officer Wihongi [one of the Salt Lake City police officers who 
responded to the incident], I felt a phone call to him would result in more of the rationalization 
and justification of what I had already heard. The mistruth by Jeff Howe on the tape provided by 
dispatch was very evident and I felt listening to more rhetoric was unnecessary." She also 
referred to a prior incident where she claimed to have "experienced a similar mistruth from Jeff 
Howe . . . several years ago." 
25. West High School received a false alarm fine in connection with the above 
incident. Peak Alarm and Jeff Howe were treated much differently. Acting in concert with the 
other Defendants and pursuant to the above-described policy and plan to bring a "test case," Ms. 
Werner caused a criminal information to be filed against Jeff Howe, alleging he had committed 
the criminal offense of violating the Utah State Code, Section 76-9-105(1), by making a false 
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alarm - a crime punishable by up to six months in jail and a fine of up to $1,000 plus an 85% 
surcharge. Conviction on this charge threatened Jeffs licensure and ability to pursue his 
livelihood. Merely bringing the charge, however, was intended to send and did send a broader, 
chilling message to Peak Alarm and the entire private security industry: the full weight of the 
criminal law will be brought to bear against those who publicly oppose "no-response" 
ordinances. 
26. Defendants undertook to convey their message with unmistakable clarity. In a 
highly unusual move, Defendants chose not to simply issue a citation; instead, Sgt. Bryant 
himself, along with another Salt Lake Cit\ Police officer, personally served the citation on Jeff 
Howe at Peak Alarm. Jeff Howe was summoned to the public reception area at Peak Alarm's 
offices, told the officers had come to "arrest" him, and fingerprinted in front of employees and 
others coming and going through the reception area. This spectacle caused him humiliation and 
injury to his reputation. 
27. Following the filing of this meritless and vindictive criminal charge, Plaintiff 
Jerry Howe sought and was granted a meeting with Defendants Dinse and Atkinson representing 
the Salt Lake City Police Department. Jerry Howe's purpose was to gain an understanding of 
whether Ms. Werner and others who engaged in the above-described conduct were acting on 
their own initiative or with the express or tacit approval of the City. At that meeting, Defendants 
Dinse and Atkinson made clear Ms. Werner was engaged in the above-described conduct under 
their direction and with their authorization and approval. 
28. Salt Lake City vigorously pursued the prosecution of the charge notwithstanding 
its lack of merit. The reason was that Defendants believed the prosecution offered the wished-
for "test case" of a new and more aggressive tactic by which they hoped to sway public opinion 
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against private security companies like Peak Alarm and in favor of "no response" ordinances by 
intimidating the industry opposition into silence. Ms. Werner confirmed this when she told the 
Security System News that she "hoped Howe would be found guilty": "I'm hoping for the 
enforcement of our ordinance that it goes well," she said. "If the jury lets Peak Alarm off the 
hook, to me that's a signal to other alarm companies to call Salt Lake City police and tell them 
whatever they want." 
29. Upon trial of the false alarm charge, Jeff Howe was not found guilty; instead, he 
was granted a directed verdict without even having to put on his defense. Summarizing the 
incident, Judge Iwasaki found as follows: 
The witnesses and evidence presented by the City established that 
there was an alarm at West High School, there were two 
unauthorized individuals on the premises of West High School 
which caused the alarm, and that no one knew what was the intent 
of the individuals, including whether they intended to cause a theft 
or commit a felony while in the West High School premises, and 
that Mrs. Hoyt had asked for police assistance in removing the 
individuals from the premises. The evidence presented above was 
undisputed. 
None of the evidence presented by the City established 
Mr. Howe's intent at the time he contacted Salt Lake City Police 
dispatch, nor was there any evidence presented by the City to 
establish that Mr. Howe knowingly or intentionally made false 
representations to Salt Lake City dispatch. 
30. Based on the foregoing facts, Judge Iwasaki concluded: 
a. The City has failed to produce any evidence establishing criminal intent. 
b. The City has not met the necessary elements to prove Mr. Howe violated 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-105(1). 
c. There has been no evidence presented that Mr. Howe knowingly or 
intentionally made false representations to Salt Lake City dispatch or made a false alarm 
as defined by Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-105(1). 
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d. Accordingly, the defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict is hereby 
granted. 
31. Defendants viewed the criminal charge against Jeff Howe and the subsequent 
prosecution as a way to send a message to the broader industry that Ms. Werner, as part of the 
City's official policy, had long targeted and tarred with broad-brush, unfair and defamatory 
comments Their purpose was not to enforce the criminal laws, but to seek to punish Mr. Howe 
for doing his job and exercising his constitutional rights, all in pursuit of the City's policy of 
using the "false alarm" statutes or ordinances and other means at their disposal to create a "test 
case" that would enshrine the City's position on "no-response" ordinances and silence those in 
the opposition During the pendency of the criminal case, Defendant Werner even denied lawful 
requests foi public information Jeff Howe needed to participate and share Peak's and the alarm 
industry's point of view in city council meeting and other forums. Even though the criminal 
charge against Jeff Howe was dismissed, the City's goal was realized. According to the Security 
Systems News, one industry insider stated "There will be a seismic shift in the industry if this 
prosecution is successful. And even if it is not, it still portends very bad things for the future of 
alarm dispatching." 
FIRST ( AUSE OF ACTION 
(False Arrest/False Imprisonment -
against the individual defendants in their individual capacities) 
32. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all allegations in paragraphs 1 through 31 of 
this Complaint. 
33. Defendants acted, intending to confine or restrain Jeff Howe, by arresting him 
thereby resulting in confinement and restraint. 
'ynonn-is t 
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34. No reasonable and prudent person acting in good faith would be justified in 
believing facts existed that would warrant the making of an arrest. 
35. At all relevant times, Defendants acted with a malicious intent to deprive Jeff 
Howe of his constitutional rights. 
36. As a result of Defendants' actions, Jeff Howe has been harmed and damaged in an 
amount to be proven at trial. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Malicious Prosecution -
against the individual defendants in their individual capacities) 
37. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all allegations in paragraphs 1 through 36 of 
this Complaint. 
38. Defendants caused a criminal proceeding to be initiated and continued against Jeff 
Howe. 
39. The criminal proceeding was terminated in Jeff Howe's favor. 
40. There was no probable cause for the proceeding, and the primary purpose was 
other than that of bringing the alleged offender to justice. 
41. Defendants commenced and continued the proceeding because of a malicious 
intent to deprive Jeff Howe of his constitutional rights. 
42. As a result of Defendants' actions, Jeff Howe has been harmed and damaged in an 
amount to be proven at trial. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(42 U.S.C. § 1983 Deprivation of Constitutional Rights -
against all Defendants in their official and individual capacities) 
43. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all allegations in paragraphs 1 through 42 of 
this Complaint. 
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44. Defendants' conduct as herein alleged establishes violations of Plaintiffs' rights 
under the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution in that 
they consist of administrative and investigative functions that led to an unreasonable seizure of 
Jeff Howe and a deprivation of his liberty without due process of law, and in that they constitute 
as well a substantive due process violation because of the degree of harm (including the loss of 
his livelihood) they sought to inflict on Jeff Howe. 
45. As set forth above, Defendant Salt Lake City Corporation implemented and 
executed an established policy, practice, custom or decision officially adopted or informally 
accepted or condoned by the City and its officials and employees. 
46. Acting under color of state law, the individual Defendants engaged in the above-
described conduct pursuant to this policy, practice, custom or decision, acting with malice at all 
relevant times. In the alternative, one or more individual Defendants failed to take action they 
were required to take to properly supervise their subordinates and stop their unlawful and 
malicious actions, in a manner that amounts to deliberate indifference. 
47. Pursuant to the policy and the individual actions pursuant thereto, and in addition 
to the violations referred to above, Defendants intended to and did retaliate against Plaintiffs and 
deprive, inhibit and punish their free exercise of rights granted under the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution by seeking to restrain them from engaging in the constitutionally 
protected activity of engaging in associations and expressing and advocating their viewpoint on 
the subject of "no-response" ordinances while Salt Lake City remained free to express and 
advocate its own competing viewpoint on the same subject, and by punishing them for 
expressing their viewpoint. Defendants' actions were intended to and did chill persons of 
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ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that constitutionally protected activity, and were 
substantially motivated as a response to the Plaintiffs' exercise of that activity. 
48. Defendants' actions were a proximate cause of injuries and damages sustained by 
Plaintiffs, such damages in an amount proven at trial. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Violation of Utah Constitution - against all Defendants 
in their individual and official capacities) 
49. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all allegations in paragraphs 1 through 48 of 
this Complaint. 
50. Defendants' conduct as herein alleged establishes violations of Plaintiffs' rights 
under Article I Sections 1, 7, 14 and 15 of the Utah Constitution. 
51. Defendants' actions were a proximate cause of injuries and damages sustained by 
Plaintiffs, such damages in an amount proven at trial. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Violation of Utah's Citizen Participation in Government Act -
against the individual defendants in their individual capacities) 
52. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all allegations in paragraphs 1 through 51 of 
this Complaint. 
53. Defendants initiated and continued a cause of action relating to or in response to 
an act of Jeff Howe while participating in the process of government. 
54. Defendants acted without a substantial basis in fact or law, and for the purpose of 
harassing, intimidating, punishing, and otherwise maliciously inhibiting the free exercise of 
rights granted under the United States and Utah Constitutions. 
55. As a result of Defendants1 actions, Jeff Howe has been harmed and damaged in an 
amount to be proven at trial. 
708903M 
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SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Tortious Interference With Existing And Prospective Business Relations -
against the individual defendants in their individual capacities) 
56. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all allegations in paragraphs 1 through 55 of 
this Complaint. 
57. Defendants knew of Jeff Howe's employment and Peak Alarm's existing and 
prospective business relations. 
58. Defendants intentionally interfered with that employment and those relations for 
improper purposes or through improper means, causing economic damage to Peak Alarm and to 
Jeff Howe. 
59. Defendants acted at all relevant times with a malicious intent. 
60. As a result of Defendants' actions, Jeff Howe and Peak Alarm have been harmed 
and damaged in an amount to be proven at trial. 
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Defamation — against Werner in her individual capacity) 
61. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all allegations in paragraphs 1 through 60 of 
this Complaint. 
62. Werner's representations to the media, to current and prospective Peak Alarm 
customers, and to other third parties, as detailed above, constitute defamation per se, in that they 
imply conduct incompatible with the operation of a lawful business, trade or profession. They 
also impeach Peak Alarm's and Jeff Howe's honesty, integrity, and reputation and expose them 
to public hatred, contempt and ridicule. 
63. Werner's representations were false and misleading, and were known by Werner 
to be false and misleading, or were made with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity. 
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64. Werner's representations were false, unprivileged, and have caused Plaintiffs to 
lose business. 
65. Werner has acted at all relevant times with a malicious intent. 
66. By reason of Werner's defamatory statements, Plaintiffs have been damaged in an 
amount to be proven at trial. 
EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress-
against the individual defendants in their individual capacities) 
67. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all allegations in paragraphs 1 through 66 of 
this Complaint 
68. Defendants' conduct, as described above, is outrageous in that it offends generally 
accepted standards of decency and morality. 
69. Defendants intended to cause emotional distress or acted with reckless disregard 
of the probability of causing emotional distress. 
70. Jeff Howe has suffered emotional distress including mental anguish, grief, and 
shame, which distress was proximately caused by Defendants' outrageous conduct. 
71. At all relevant times, Defendants acted with a malicious intent. 
72. By reason of Defendants7 outrageous conduct, Plaintiffs have been damaged in an 
amount to be proven at trial. 
NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Conspiracy to Violate Constitutional Rights -
against the individual defendants in their individual capacities) 
73. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all allegations in paragraphs 1 through 72 of 
this Complaint. 
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74. Defendants, in the manner and by the methods described above, have engaged in 
a civil conspiracy to deprive Plaintiffs of their constitutional rights. 
75. On information and belief, Defendants came to a meeting of the minds regarding 
their objectives. 
76. Defendants have engaged, collectively or individually, in one or more overt 
unlawful acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, including but not limited to: 
a. False arrest/false imprisonment, as set forth and alleged above; 
b. Malicious prosecution, as set forth and alleged above; 
c. Deprivation of constitutional rights, as set forth and alleged above; 
d. Violation of Utah's Citizen Participation in Government Act, as set forth and 
alleged above; 
e. Tortious interference with existing and prospective business relations, as set forth 
and alleged above; 
f. Defamation, as set forth and alleged above; and 
g. Intentional infliction of emotional distress, as set forth and alleged above. 
77. As a direct and proximate result of these defendants' civil conspiracy, Plaintiffs 
have suffered economic injury and loss. 
78. Defendants acted at all relevant times with a malicious intent. 
79. By reason of Defendants' outrageous conduct, Plaintiffs have been damaged in an 
amount to be proven at trial. 
Tenth Cause of Action 
(Negligence - against Defendant Salt Lake City) 
80. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all allegations in paragraphs 1 through 79 of 
this Complaint. 
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81. Defendants, as public employees, have a duty to individuals and entities such as 
Plaintiffs to exercise reasonable care in the performance of their duties, including the 
interpretation, application and enforcement of city ordinances and state statutes. 
82. At a minimum, Defendants Werner, Bryant and others failed to exercise 
reasonable care in the performance of their duties, in that, among other things, they failed to 
exercise reasonable care in the interpretation, application and/or enforcement of City ordinances 
and/or state statutes. 
83. Defendants' negligent acts and omissions proximately caused injuries to 
Plaintiffs, as set forth above. 
84. Defendant Salt Lake City is liable for injuries proximately cause to Plaintiffs by 
its employees' negligent acts or omissions committed within the scope of their employment. 
WHERFORR, Plaintiffs pray for relief as follows: 
1. A judgment against Defendants for the legal fees and costs incurred in the defense 
of Jeff Howe's criminal proceeding plus lost wages, totaling an amount not less than $33,213.72, 
plus interest. 
2. In addition to out-of-pocket damages, Plaintiffs seek all other damages allowed by 
law in an amount currently unknown but believed to be not less than $100,000.00, plus punitive 
damages as may be appropriate based on the malicious nature of the conduct alleged. 
3. Plaintiffs also seek declaratory and injunctive relief, and their attorneys' fees and 
costs incurred in the prosecution of this action. 
4. Plaintiffs pray for such other and further relief as the Court deems just and 
appropriate. 
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J da DATED this day of September, 2005. 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH PC 
Ten C. Clark 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Plaintiffs' Address: 
1504 South Gladiola 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84127-0127 
Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that on the 3 day of September, 2005, I caused to be mailed, 
postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED COMPLAINT to the 
following: 
Morris O Haggerty 
Senior Salt Lake City Attorney 
Room 505, City and County Building 
451 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
J. Wesley Robinson 
Senior Salt Lake City Attorney 
Room 505, City and County Building 
451 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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5.08.020 Definitions: 
A. "Alarm business" means any persons engaged in the business of selling, installing, planning 
the installation, assisting in planning the installation, servicing, maintaining, monitoring, 
repairing, replacing, moving or removing alarm systems in the city. 
B. "Alarm administrator" means the individual designated by the chief of police to issue permits 
and enforce the provisions of this title. 
C. "Alarm dispatch request" means a notification to the police by the alarm business that an 
alarm, either manual or automatic, has been activated at a particular alarm site. 
D. "Alarm site" means a single premises or location served by an alarm system or systems. 
Each tenancy, if served by a separate alarm system in a multitenant building or complex, 
shall be considered a separate alarm site. 
E. "Alarm system" means any mechanism, equipment, or device which is designated to detect 
an unauthorized entry into any building or onto any property, or to direct attention to a 
robbery, burglary, or other emergency in progress, and to signal the above occurrences 
either by a local or audible alarm or by a silent or remote alarm. The following devices shall 
not constitute alarm systems within the meaning of this subsection: 
1. Devices, which do not register alarms that are audible, visible, or perceptible outside the 
protected premises; 
2. Devices which are not installed, operated or used for the purpose of reporting an 
emergency to the police department; 
3. Alarm devices installed on a temporary basis by the police department. 
F. "Alarm user" means the person, occupant, firm, partnership, association, corporation, 
company or organization of any kind in control of any building, structure or facility or portion 
thereof wherein an alarm system is maintained. 
G. "Apartment building" means any building containing two (2) or more rental units. 
H. "Automatic dialing device" means an alarm system which automatically sends over regular 
telephone lines, by direct connection or otherwise, a prerecorded voice-message indicating 
the existence of an emergency situation that the alarm system is designed to detect. 
I. "Central station" means an office to which alarm systems are connected, where operators 
supervise the circuits on a continuous basis, and where there is a subsequent relaying of 
such messages by a live voice to the police department. 
J. "Duress alarm" means a silent alarm signal generated by the manual activation of a device 
intended to signal a crisis situation requiring police response. 
K. "Emergency" means the commission or attempted commission of a robbery, burglary or 
other criminal action. 
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L. "Employee" means any person who is employed by an alarm business and who sells, 
installs, services, maintains, repairs, or replaces alarm systems in the city. 
M. "False alarm" means the activation of an alarm system, which results in an arrival at the 
alarm site by the police department where an emergency does not exist. It includes an 
alarm signal caused by conditions of nature, which are normal for that area. "False alarm" 
does not include an alarm signal caused by extraordinarily violent conditions of nature such 
as tornadoes, floods and earthquakes. 
N. "Holdup alarm" means a silent alarm signal generated by the manual activation of a device 
intended to signal a robbery in progress. 
O. "Intrusion alarm system" means an alarm system signaling an entry or attempted entry into 
the area protected by the system. 
P. "Local alarm" means any alarm device audible at the alarm site. 
Q. "One Plus duress alarm" means the manual activation of a silent alarm signal by entering at 
a keypad a code that adds one to the last digit of the normal arm/disarm code (e.g., normal 
code = 1234; One Plus duress code = 1225). 
R. "Panic alarm" means an audible alarm system signal generated by the manual activation of 
a device intended to signal a life threatening or emergency situation requiring law 
enforcement response. 
S. "Permittee" means the person to whom an alarm user permit is issued. 
T. "Person" means and includes natural persons, without regard to number or gender, and any 
partnership, corporation, and any other type of legal entity. 
U. "Private guard responder" means a private guard company, an alarm company's guard, an 
alarm user, or a person or entity appointed by an alarm user to be responsible to confirm 
that an attempted or actual crime has occurred at an alarm site. (Ord. 64-00 § 1, 2000) 
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5.08.095 False Alarms: 
A. Except for alarms at a wholesale or retail firearms business, intrusion alarm response shall 
be dispatched by the police department only after a private guard responder has confirmed 
that an attempted or actual crime has occurred at the alarm site. 
B. A one hundred fifty dollar ($150.00) penalty per incident shall be charged to a central station 
or alarm company for each request for police response from a duress, panic or holdup 
alarm where no valid alarm user permit is provided to police dispatch by the central station. 
Police response to duress alarms shall be limited to alarms originating from a stationary 
building structure. 
C. Any false information provided to the alarm administrator or to police dispatch by any alarm 
user, central station, alarm company, or private guard responder may be a crime under 
section 11.04.090 or 11.04.100 of this code and shall be dealt with accordingly. 
D. Activation of a duress, panic, or holdup alarm which is determined to be false by the police 
department shall result in an assessment of a penalty of one hundred dollars ($100.00) for 
the first, one hundred fifty dollars ($150.00) for the second, two hundred fifty dollars 
($250.00) for the third, three hundred fifty dollars ($350.00) for the fourth, and four hundred 
fifty dollars ($450.00) for the fifth, and each additional false alarm within each three 
hundred sixty five (365) day period. Each false intrusion alarm shall result in an 
assessment of a one hundred dollar ($100.00) penalty. The alarm user shall be responsible 
for false alarms caused by any person having authorized access to the premises from the 
alarm user. 
E. All penalties assessed under this chapter shall be due and payable on the date written 
notice of any penalty due is issued. Any penalty, which is paid within thirty (30) days of the 
due date, shall be reduced by fifty dollars ($50.00). Any penalty, which is paid after thirty 
(30) days and within sixty (60) days of the due date, shall be reduced by twenty five dollars 
($25.00). Any penalty paid after sixty (60) days from the due date shall not be reduced. If 
any penalty is not paid within ninety (90) days of the due date, the city may use such lawful 
means as are available to collect such penalties. In the event the city files an action in court 
to recover such penalties, the city shall be entitled to recovery of its costs and attorney fees 
in addition to the penalties due and owing. 
F. The alarm administrator may implement a false alarm prevention course. The course shall 
inform alarm users of the problems created by false alarm dispatches and how users may 
operate an alarm system without generating false alarm dispatches. Users who complete 
the course shall be issued a certificate worth the dismissal of one false alarm penalty of up 
to one hundred dollars ($100.00). No permittee shall be entitled to take such course and 
receive a penalty waiver more than once per year. (Ord. 64-00 § 1, 2000) 
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